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Abstract The automation of bargaining is receiving a lot of attention in artificial
intelligence research. Indeed, considering that bargaining is the most common form
of economic transaction, its automation could lead software agents to reach more
effective agreements. In the present paper we focus on the best-known bargaining
protocol, i.e., the alternating-offers protocol. It provides an elegant mechanism
whereby a buyer and a seller can bilaterally bargain. Although this protocol and
its refinements have been studied extensively, no work up to the present provides
an adequate model for bargaining in electronic markets. A result of these settings
means that multiple buyers are in competition with each other for the purchase of
a good from the same seller while, analogously, multiple sellers are in competition
with each other for the sale of a good to the same buyer. The study of these settings
is of paramount importance, as they will be commonplace in real-world applications.
In the present paper we provide a model that extends the alternating-offers protocol
to include competition among agents.1 Our game theoretical analysis shows that the
proposed model is satisfactory: it effectively captures the competition among agents,
equilibrium strategies are efficiently computable, and the equilibrium outcome is
unique. The main results we achieve are the following. 1) With m buyers and n sellers
and when the outside option (i.e., the possibility of leaving a negotiation to start a
new one) is inhibited, we show that it can be reduced to a problem of matching and
that can be addressed by using the Gale-Shapley’s stable marriage algorithm. The
equilibrium outcome is unique and can be computed in O(l · m · n · T + (m + n)2),
where l is the number of the issues and T is the maximum length of the bargaining.
2) With m buyers and one seller and when the seller can exploit the outside option,
1The proposed model has been preliminarily presented in [19] and in [21].
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we show that agents’ equilibrium strategies can be computed in O(l · m · T) and may
be not unique. However, we show that a simple refinement of the agents’ utility
functions leads to equilibrium uniqueness.
Keywords Multiagent systems · Negotiations · Game theory
Mathematics Subject Classifications (2000) 91A10 · 91A80
1 Introduction
The automation of processes whereby electronic agents carry out economic transac-
tions is one of the most challenging issues in artificial intelligence research [26]. The
prominence of this challenge is widely acknowledged, as intelligent agents who nego-
tiate with each other on behalf of human users are expected to lead to more efficient
negotiations [42]. Although a vast literature studies this topic [7, 9, 11, 29, 31, 43],
automated negotiation is still far from being widely employed in real-world electronic
markets, since many problems remain open in the many existing negotiation settings.
Among the negotiation settings for commercial transactions, a crucial role is
played by bilateral bargaining. A bilateral bargaining situation involves two parties
who work in cooperation towards the creation of a commonly desirable surplus
over whose distribution both parties are in conflict [44]. Bargaining situations are
much used in real-world applications and constitute the most common of economic
transactions. Moreover, the bargaining can be over one issue (e.g., price), in which
case it is called single-issue bargaining, or it can be over multiple issues (e.g., price
and quality), in which case it is called multi-issue bargaining. The formalized study
of bargaining is commonly carried out by employing game-theoretical tools [34]
with which one distinguishes the negotiation protocol and the negotiation strategies:
the protocol sets the negotiation rules, specifying which actions are allowed and
when [37]; a strategy is an agent’s specific behavior in the negotiation. Given a
bargaining protocol, the game-theoretical approach postulates that rational agents
should employ strategies that are somehow in equilibrium [14]. Nash equilibrium
constitutes the basic equilibrium concept.
The best known protocol for bilateral bargaining is the alternating-offers protocol.
It was pioneered by Ståhl in [45], refined by Rubinstein in [38], and is considered
the main protocol for bilateral negotiations [26]. The alternating-offers protocol has
received a lot of attention, first in economic literature to analyze human transac-
tions [36] and later in computer science to automate electronic transactions [29]. The
alternating-offers protocol is simple: an agent makes an offer for the issue under
dispute and the opponent can accept it, exit or make a counteroffer [9]; if the op-
ponent accepts, the negotiation concludes with an agreement; if the opponent exits,
the negotiation concludes with a disagreement; if a counteroffer is made, the process
is repeated until the negotiation concludes with an agreement or a disagreement.
Essentially, the alternating-offers bargaining protocol is an infinite extensive-form
game, as both agents can make a real value proposal and no temporal deadline is
present in the protocol. The payoffs of each agent depend on certain parameters: her
reservation price, her time discount factor, and her temporal deadline.
Extending alternating-offers in markets 191
Although the analysis of the alternating-offers bargaining protocol in real-world
settings is far from being completely understood, recently achieved computational
results have been promising for its future employment. In [8] we see that the problem
of efficiently negotiating multiple issues with complete information can be reduced
in polynomial time (in the number of issues) to the problem of negotiating a single
issue. This result was refined in [11], showing that this reduction can be accomplished
in linear time (in the number of issues), since it can be formulated as a fractional
knapsack problem [32]. Moreover, in [11] the authors show that the solution can
be provided in polynomial time (in the number of agents’ types) when the weights
related to the issues in the agents’ utility functions are uncertain. Finally, in [6, 20]
the authors show that, in the presence of one-sided uncertain deadlines, the solution
can be provided in time asymptotically independent of the number of types of the
agent whose deadline is uncertain.
Up to now the literature has focused attention mainly on bargaining settings
where there are several issues to negotiate and/or where there is uncertainty over
one or more parameters in agents’ utility functions. A crucial setting that currently
does not find a satisfactory analysis in the literature is the setting in which the two
bargainers act in a market of bargaining agents. The peculiarity of this setting is
that multiple buyers are in competition with respect to the purchase of an item
from the same seller while, analogously, multiple sellers are in competition with
respect to the sale of an item to the same buyer. The analysis of such a setting
is well known to be of paramount importance, indeed it would provide a natural
approach to the understanding of how prices may emerge in markets as a direct
consequence of the interaction of agents [44]. Moreover, it will be common in
real-world applications. The original alternating-offers protocol does not provide a
satisfactory model to describe the considered situation, since it exclusively captures
purely bilateral settings [36]. The competition within markets of bargaining agents
is elegantly captured in microeconomics/game theory by introducing agents’ outside
options in the negotiation mechanism [1, 25, 40]. The term “outside option” denotes
the possibility for an agent of leaving the negotiation she is currently carrying out
and negotiate with a different opponent [1]. Essentially, the introduction of the
outside option within the alternating-offers protocol preserves the bilaterality of the
negotiation (i.e., at each time point only two agents negotiate), but allows agents at
each time point to change the opponent with whom they are negotiating. Obviously,
at the equilibrium, the outside option will be exploited if it pays better than
Rubinstein equilibrium, and ignored otherwise. The refinements of the alternating-
offers protocol proposed in microeconomics/game theory literature that deals with
the outside option, e.g., see [1, 25, 40], are based on assumptions too restrictive to
be satisfactorily employed in real-world electronic transactions. To be more precise,
they assume that all the buyers (sellers) have the same parameters, that the agents do
not have deadlines, and that the process whereby the agents are matched is random,
meaning the agents not being allowed to choose their opponent. Therefore, there is a
gap between the bargaining models currently studied in literature and the bargaining
situations commonly present in real-world electronic markets.
In the present paper we aim at closing this gap. More precisely, the original
contributions we present in this paper are the following. (1) We provide a model
that satisfactorily extends the alternating-offers protocol within an electronic market:
(1.a) the model both rules the matching between agents and allows agents to exploit
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the outside option choosing explicitly the opponent with whom they want to start
a new negotiation, (1.b) agents can have different parameters, have deadlines, and
can negotiate over multiple issues, (1.c) equilibrium strategies are unique, and (1.d)
agents’ equilibrium strategies, in the presence of a unique buyer and a unique
seller, collapse to the ones in the original alternating-offers model. (2) We game
theoretically study the proposed model providing the following results. (2.a) When
the outside option is inhibited, the problem can be reduced in polynomial time in
the number of agents to one of matching and can be solved by using the Gale-
Shapley’s stable marriage algorithm [18]. The computational complexity of finding
the equilibrium matching is O(l · m · n · T + (m + n)2) where l is the number of
issues, m is the number of buyer agents, n is the number of seller agents, and T
is the longest deadline. (2.b) When there is a unique seller and the outside option
is not inhibited (the reverse situation is analogous), agents’ equilibrium strategies
can be computed in time O(l · n · T) and may not be unique. However, we show
that a simple refinement of agents’ utility functions allows for the equilibrium to be
unique. We show also how the equilibrium strategies are affected by the presence of
competition among the buyer agents. Finally, we discuss how the results presented in
this paper can be employed to study settings with uncertainty.
The analysis of the settings with one-sided outside option and with complete
information paves the way for further studies that we shall address in future. Initially,
we remark the relevance of analyzing settings with one-sided outside option. We
notice that a large number of concrete economic settings, although they present
multiple buyers and sellers, can be reduced to one-sided competition situations. For
instance, all the economic situations where there are m buyer agents that desires an
item A and n sellers, each one with m or more units of A to sell, can be reduced to
m independent economic situations each one with a specific buyer and n sellers. That
is, the competition involves only the sellers and not the buyers. This is common in
markets with electronic shops, which can have a huge storage capacity. Furthermore,
the analysis of settings with two-sided outside option will be the ‘natural’ extension
of that with one-sided outside option. We remark the relevance of analyzing settings
with complete information. This analysis is of paramount importance to derive
properties inherent the negotiation mechanism, e.g., equilibrium uniqueness and
unreasonable equilibrium strategies. Furthermore, this analysis is fundamental for
studying the model with incomplete information. We recall that there not exists
any algorithm that can be generally applied to solve bargaining with uncertainty.
Extensions of the backward induction algorithm were proposed (e.g., see [11]),
but these algorithms are not (generally) sound, as the authors showed in [6, 20].
Algorithms for addressing bargaining with uncertainty are usually designed ad-hoc
for the specific bargaining settings as extension of the algorithm for the computation
of the strategies with complete information [20].
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the model and
the analysis of the classic alternating-offers bargaining protocol with complete
information in the presence of agents’ deadlines. In Section 3 we review the known
published results on bargaining in markets and we propose our bargaining model. In
Section 4 we game theoretically analyze the proposed model when the outside option
is inhibited. In Section 5 we game theoretically analyze the settings where there is a
unique seller and two buyers and the outside option is not inhibited. Section 6 briefly
discusses how the proposed result can be employed to study settings with uncertainty.
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Section 7 concludes the paper. In Appendix A we extends the result discussed in
Section 5 to the situation wherein there is a generic number of buyers. In Appendix B
we report the proofs of the main theoretical results discussed along the paper.
2 Bargaining with deadlines
In this section we review the classic bilateral alternating-offers protocol where agents
have deadlines, in order for us to introduce models, notations, and know results. We
initially describe (Section 2.1) the bargaining protocol and subsequently we review
(Section 2.2) how the equilibrium strategies can be produced in the presence of
complete information.
2.1 Bargaining model
The alternating-offers bargaining protocol is an extensive-form game where two
agents, a buyer b and a seller s, try to agree on the value of one or more issues.
For the sake of presentation, in the present paper we study single-issue settings and
we discuss how the results can be extended to multi-issue settings. This is because,
as is shown in [8, 11], with complete information the study of multi-issue settings
can be reduced (in linear time) to the study of single-issue settings. We discuss how
this reduction can be addressed in the next section. The alternating-offers protocol
is characterized by a player function ι : N → {b, s} that returns the agent which acts
at time t and is such that ι(t) = ι(t + 1). The agent ι(0) that opens the negotiation
is a parameter of the protocol. At time t > 0 agent ι(t) can make one of the three
following actions:
– (i) offer(x), where x ∈ R,
– (ii) exit,
– (iii) accept.
At t = 0 agent ι(0) can choose only (i) or (ii). If σι(t)(t) = accept the game stops and
the outcome is the agreement (x, t), where x is the value such that σι(t−1)(t − 1) =
offer(x). This is to say that the agents have agreed on the value x at t. If σι(t)(t) = exit
the game stops and the outcome is NoAgreement. This is to say that the agents have
not found an agreement. Otherwise the bargaining continues to the next time point.
The utility of an agreement (x, t) for agent i is given by a utility function Ui :
(R × N) ∪ {NoAgreement} → R that depends on three parameters of agent i: the
reservation price RPi ∈ R+, the temporal discount factor δi ∈ (0, 1], and the deadline
Ti ∈ N, Ti > 0. The values RPb, RPs, δb, δs, Tb, and Ts are parameters of the
protocol. If the outcome of the bargaining is an agreement (x, t), then the utility
functions Ub and Us are respectively:
Ub(x, t) =
{
(RPb − x) · δtb if t ≤ Tb
−1 otherwise , Us(x, t) =
{
(x − RPs) · δts if t ≤ Ts
−1 otherwise .
If the outcome is NoAgreement, then agents do not receive any gain from the
negotiation, namely, Ub(NoAgreement) = Us(NoAgreement) = 0. Notice that the
assignment of a strictly negative value (we have chosen by convention the value −1)
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to Ui after agent i’s deadline allows one to capture the essence of the deadline: an
agent, after her deadline, strictly prefers to exit the negotiation rather than to reach
any agreement.
Finally, we standardly assume the feasibility of the problem, i.e., RPb ≥ RPs, and
the rationality of the agents, i.e., it is common knowledge that each agent will act to
maximize her utility.
2.2 Equilibrium strategies
When the information is complete the appropriate solution concept for the game we
are dealing with is the subgame perfect equilibrium [24]. Subgame perfect equilibrium
prescribes strategies that are of equilibrium in every possible subgame. These
strategies can easily be found by employing the backward induction method [13].
We briefly review the use of backward induction in this setting since it will play a
crucial role in the analysis of the extension we propose in Section 3.2; details can be
found in [34].
The time point T where the game rationally stops is initially determined: it is
T = min{Tb, Ts}. The equilibrium outcome of every subgame starting from t ≥ T is
NoAgreement, since at least one agent, gaining negative utility from reaching any
agreement beyond T, will exit. Therefore, at T agent ι(T) would accept any offer x
which gives her a utility no worse than NoAgreement, namely, any offer x such that
Uι(T)(x, T) ≥ 0. That is, any x ≤ RPb if ι(T) = b and any x ≥ RPs if ι(T) = s. From
t = T − 1 back to t = 0, it is possible to find the optimal offer agent ι(t) can make at
t, if she makes an offer, and the offers that she would accept. We denote by x∗(t) the
optimal offer of agent ι(t) at t. The optimal offer an agent can make is the offer that,
among all the ones that her opponent will accept at the next time point, gives her
the maximum utility. More precisely, x∗(t) is the offer such that at t + 1, if t < T − 1,
agent ι(t + 1) is indifferent between accepting it and rejecting it to make her optimal
offer x∗(t + 1) and, if t = T − 1, agent ι(t + 1) is indifferent between accepting it and
choosing exit. On the equilibrium path, although at t agent ι(t) is indifferent between
accepting x∗(t − 1) and rejecting it to make her optimal action between offer(x∗(t))
and exit, agent ι(t) will always accept x∗(t − 1). It can be shown indeed that there
is no equilibrium when agent ι(t) rejects x∗(t − 1). Essentially, the non-existence of
the equilibrium is due to the fact that x is a real number: if b (or s) rejects the
offer x∗(t − 1) at t, then the optimal offer of s (or b) at t − 1 does not exist, being
x∗(t − 1) −  (or x∗(t − 1) + ) with  > 0 and  → 0; details on the proof can be
found in [34]. In formula, x∗(t) is such that Uι(t+1)(x∗(t), t) = Uι(t+1)(x∗(t + 1), t + 1) if
t < T − 1 and Uι(t+1)(x∗(t), t) = 0 if t = T − 1. The offers agent ι(t) would accept at t
are all those offers that give her a utility no worse than the utility given by offering
x∗(t). That is, any x ≤ x∗(t) if ι(t) = b and any x ≥ x∗(t) if ι(t) = s. In summary, the
equilibrium strategies in any subgame starting from 0 ≤ t < T prescribe that agent
ι(t) offers x∗(t) at t and agent ι(t + 1) accepts it at t + 1.
In order to provide a recursive formula for x∗(t), we introduce the notion of
backward propagation [7]: given value x and agent i, we call backward propagation
of value x for agent i the value y such that Ui(y, t − 1) = Ui(x, t); we shall employ the
arrow notation x←i for backward propagations. In formula, x←b = RPb − (RPb −
x) · δb and x←s = RPs + (x − RPs) · δs. If a value x is propagated backward n times
for agent i, we write x←n[i]; for instance x←2[i] = (x←i)←i. If a value is propagated
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backward for more than one agent according to a given sequence, we list them left
to right in the subscript; for instance x←i2[ j] = ((x←i)← j)← j and x←iji = ((x←i)← j)←i.
(Notice that the definition of backward propagation is general and does not depend
on the specific game we are studying.) The values of x∗(t) can be calculated from
t = T − 1 back to t = 0 as follows:
x∗(t) =
{
RPι(t+1) if t = T − 1
(x∗(t + 1))←ι(t+1) if t < T − 1 .
Finally, the equilibrium strategies can be easily defined on the basis of x∗(t) as
collections of choice rules:
σ ∗b (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < T
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≤ (x∗(t))←b
otherwise offer(x∗(t))
T ≤ t ≤ Tb
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≤ RPb
otherwise exit
Tb < t exit
,
σ ∗s (t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
t = 0 offer(x∗(0))
0 < t < T
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ (x∗(t))←s
otherwise offer(x∗(t))
T ≤ t ≤ Ts
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ RPs
exit otherwise
Ts < t exit
.
Now we state the following proposition, which is a well known published result;
the proof can be found in [34].
Proposition 2.1 The above strategies constitute the unique subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the game described in Section 2.1.
We briefly review the proof, since it will be useful in the analysis we make in
Section 5. We recall that an extensive-form game admits multiple equilibria when
agents, at some decision nodes, have multiple optimal actions. It can be easily
observed that at each step of the above backward induction construction all the
actions of the agents are dominated but two: to accept x∗(t) and to reject it to make
the optimal action between offer(x∗(t + 1)) and exit. Therefore, any possible equi-
librium strategy cannot prescribe actions different from these. We have previously
shown that there cannot be any equilibrium strategy that prescribes agent ι(t) to
reject x∗(t − 1). Therefore, although at each time point agents have actions that are
indifferent to their optimal actions, the equilibrium strategies are unique.
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Finally, it can be observed that the above equilibrium strategies can be found in
time linear in T, namely, O(T).
In Fig. 1 and in Fig. 2 we depict two examples of backward induction constructions.
The parameters in both examples are RPb = 1, δb = .95, Tb = 11, RPs = 0, δs = .95,
and Ts = 12. The situation depicted in Fig. 1 is characterized by ι(0) = s, whereas in
the situation depicted in Fig. 2 ι(0) = b. We report at each time t point the optimal
offer of agent ι(t). The lines connecting two consecutive offers are isoutility curves.
In both examples T = min{Tb, Ts} = 11. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 1. The
agent that acts at t = 11 is b. Therefore, x∗(10) = RPb = 1, x∗(9) = (x∗(10))←s = .95,
x∗(8) = (x∗(9))←b = .9525, and so on. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 2. The
agent that acts at t = 11 is s. Therefore, x∗(10) = RPs = 0, x∗(9) = (x∗(10))←b = .05,
x∗(8) = (x∗(9))←s = .0475, and so on. It is worth noting that in the alternating-
offers bargaining protocol the agent which acts at t = T − 1 gains benefit from the
protocol independently of her deadline, whereas the agent with the latest deadline
cannot exercise her strength. Consider the game depicted in Fig. 1: s must accept
her reservation price at t = 10 even when her deadline is much longer than the
opponent’s one. This drawback of the protocol is partially mitigated in the presence
of competition among several buyers. As we shall show in Section 5, in the presence
of several possible opponents the position of s gets stronger: s could prefer to leave
the current negotiation and start a new one instead of accepting her reservation price.
We briefly review how multiple issue bargaining settings can be studied; details
can be found in [7, 8]. In presence of multiple issues, several procedures can be
employed to negotiate the issues, e.g., sequentially or simultaneously. The most
efficient procedure (in terms of Pareto efficiency) is the in-bundle procedure [11],
i.e., when agents simultaneously negotiate all the issues, and we therefore limit our
analysis to this procedure. Agents’ equilibrium strategies are very similar to the ones
in the presence of a single issue: they can be defined on a sequence of optimal offers.
These offers are l-tuples, where l is the number of the issues, and specify one value
for each issue, e.g., x∗(t) = 〈x1, . . . , xl〉. As is with single-issue bargaining, agents
will accept any offer that is not worse than offering their optimal offer and at the
Fig. 1 Backward induction
constructions with RPb = 1,
δb = .95, Tb = 11, RPs = 0,
δs = .95, Ts = 12, and ι(0) = s
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Fig. 2 Backward induction
constructions with RPb = 1,
δb = .95, Tb = 11, RPs = 0,
δs = .95, Ts = 12, and ι(0) = b
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equilibrium each optimal offer x∗(t) will be accepted at t + 1. The sequence of the op-
timal offers x∗(t)s can be found by backward induction, but an extension of the
backward propagation of an offer we defined above is needed. More precisely, the
backward induction construction is the same: at each time point t the optimal offer
x∗(t) of agent ι(t) is the offer such that agent ι(t + 1) is indifferent at t + 1 between
accepting it and making her optimal offer x∗(t + 1). In formula, Uι(t+1)(x∗(t), t + 1) =
Uι(t+1)(x∗(t + 1), t + 2). The difference between the multiple issue situation and the
single issue situation depends on how x∗(t) can be computed given x∗(t + 1). With
a single issue, the backward propagation y = x←i is a function that maps an offer
x ∈ R at t to an offer y ∈ R at t − 1 (keeping constant the utility of agent i) and the
calculation of y can be easily accomplished in closed form. With multiple issues, the
backward propagation y = x←i maps an offer x ∈ Rl at t to an offer y ∈ Rl at t − 1
(keeping constant the utility of agent i) and the calculation of y requires the solution
of a convex programming problem [7]. In the most common situations where the
utility functions are linear, this problem can be solved in linear time in the number
of issues, being a fractional knapsack problem (a proof is provided in [10]).
3 Bargaining in markets
In this section we review (Section 3.1) the main contributions presented in the
literature on the analysis of bargaining within markets and we present (Section 3.2)
a bargaining model that extends the model described in Section 2.1.
3.1 Bargaining and markets in literature
As underlined in [36] and in [44] bargaining theory provides a natural approach to the
understanding of how prices may emerge in markets as a consequence of the direct
interaction of agents. For the sake of argument, consider a market populated by one
seller and multiple buyers. The buyers are ‘naturally’ in competition, since every
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buyer would receive a gain from drawing up a contract with the seller rather than
abstaining from doing so, but only one buyer will make it. Therefore, we expect that
the position of the seller agent gets stronger and that her gain increases with respect
to the situation in which there is no competition among buyers. Obviously, the larger
the number of the buyers, the stronger the position of the seller and the higher the
prices of the contract which the seller can draw up. The original alternating-offers
protocol presented in Section 2.1 does not provide a satisfactory description of the
situation where agents act within a market, not taking into account explicitly the
competition among the agents. This inadequacy of the original alternating-offers
protocol has pushed researchers to extend this model. In particular, the two main
issues to address when taking into account agents’ competition within a market are:
1. static competition: an agent that is not negotiating can choose the opponent with
whom to negotiate among a number of agents, e.g., given a seller and multiple
buyers, the seller will choose to negotiate with the buyer from whom she expects
to gain the maximum utility;
2. dynamic competition: an agent that is negotiating can choose to leave the negoti-
ation she is carrying out to start a new negotiation with a different opponent.2
Technically speaking, addressing the first point essentially requires complementing
the original protocol by introducing the rules for the matching of the agents. It can
be easily observed that these rules do not alter the negotiation process: once two
agents are matched, they negotiate as prescribed in the previous section. Addressing
the second point instead leads to a different negotiation protocol, thus producing
different agreements between the agents. We briefly review the main related works.
A large amount of works on dynamic competition in bargaining can be found in
classical microeconomics/game theory literature [44]. They can be grouped in two
main areas according to the perspective of their analysis: they can analyze markets in
the small or in the large. In both these two areas, the works presented in the literature
consider only complete information settings wherein agents have no deadlines, have
the same reservation prices and discount factors, and negotiate on a single issue.3 We
briefly review the main contributions within these two areas.
The analysis of markets in the small has explored models wherein two agents
bargain, but at least one may have an outside option. The outside option denotes
the possibility for an agent of leaving the negotiation she is carrying out and gain an
amount of utility. In practice, an agent has an outside option when there are several
possible opponents and she can leave the negotiation she is carrying on to negotiate
with a different opponent. This allows a seller agent (buyer agent) to take advantage,
at every time point of the negotiation, from the competition among the buyer agents
2For the sake of completeness, we notice that action exit could be used to stop a negotiation in order
to start a new negotiation with a different opponent. However, as we discuss in Section 4.1, this use
raises several complications and we shall show that is not satisfactory.
3Two exceptions there are: in [12] the authors consider bargaining settings with uncertainty over
agents’ valuations and in [25] the authors consider settings with exogenous deadlines. However, both
these works study a simplification of the alternating-offers protocol in which the seller can make an
offer, whereas the buyer can only accept it or not.
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(seller agents) present in the market. At the equilibrium, the outside option is used
if it pays better than the Rubinstein equilibrium but it is ignored otherwise. The
objective of the analysis within this area is the comprehension of how the availability
of the outside option (and then of competition among agents) alters the Rubinstein
equilibrium. The most well known results can be found in [1, 25, 41]. In [1] the authors
do not explicitly model the presence of several opponents, but they assign a specific
value to the outside option. They present an experimental analysis considering three
different settings, each one characterized by a specific value for the outside option. In
these situations the equilibrium is unique. As the authors underline, the uniqueness
of the equilibrium is of paramount importance in the presence of multiple agents such
as in markets. This is particularly crucial in electronic markets, where each agent
can be developed by different designers and could employ different equilibrium
strategies. In [25] the authors do explicitly model the presence of several opponents
and assume the matching between the agents to be random. At each time point there
is a positive value of probability that an agent will meet a different opponent. They
show that in this setting the agreement between the agents can be delayed. In [41] the
authors show that usually markets involving a small number of agents do not yield
competitive allocations because market power is retained by some traders.
In the analysis of markets in the large, the models commonly studied in the
literature assume a continuum of agents who are matched at random in pairs to
perform a trade of commodities. The objective of the analysis within this area is
radically different from that of the previous area. More precisely, it is the analysis of
the equilibrium of the market. The most well known results can be found in [5, 15–
17, 40]. All these works provide very simple bargaining models and they usually
consider perfectly competitive situations wherein the actions made by an agent do
not affect the behavior of their competitors. Different works have taken in to account
different market settings: stationary markets in which there is a constant rate of
agents entering the market [40], and non-stationary markets in which the rate changes
during time [17]. We do not discuss the specific details of these works, as they are
somewhat beside the point of the present paper. We point the interested reader
to [44].
For the sake of completeness, we note that a few works on the analysis of
bargaining in markets can also be found in computer science literature. However,
the scope of these works is different. The problem they consider is to coordinate
concurrent negotiations, e.g., see [35], and not to study the effects of the presence of
the outside option in bargaining.
The results cited above are inapplicable to real-world electronic markets wherein
autonomous agents carry out electronic transactions. The main reasons lay in the in-
adequacies of the bargaining models they consider (i.e., agents do not have deadlines,
and reservation prices and discount factors are the same for all the agents) and in the
unsatisfactory matching model they adopt (i.e., the agents are matched at random).
In real-world settings agents have deadlines, have different utility parameters, and
it is reasonable to assume that each agent can choose the opponent with whom she
will negotiate. The analysis we carry out in this paper is closer to the analysis of the
markets in the small. To be more precise, we propose a bargaining model which
is more realistic with respect to the ones cited above and we game theoretically
analyze the equilibrium strategies in the presence of complete information to derive
an efficient solving algorithm.
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3.2 The proposed model
We extend the model presented in Section 2.1 to capture the situation where:
– there are m buyer agents and n seller agents;
– the items sold by the sellers are equal;
– all the sellers have exactly one item to sell;
– all the buyers are interested in buying exactly one item;
– agents can enter the market at any time point.
We denote by bi the i-th buyer agent—her parameters will be RPbi , Tbi , and δbi —and
by s j the j-th seller agent—her parameters will be RPs j , Ts j , and δs j . Furthermore,
each agent, both bi and s j, will be characterized by a time point denoted by Abi and
As j , respectively, where she enters the market. An agent i can act in a market from
t = Ai.
We design our bargaining model such that:
– at any time point non-matched agents can match non-matched opponents;
– if an agent is negotiating with an opponent, she can leave the negotiation she is
carrying out to match a non-matched opponent (i.e., outside option);
– two agents that match at t will start to negotiate at t + d where d ∈ N, d > 0 (the
value of d captures a possible delay due to the negotiation platform or set by
the electronic institution; we assume that the platform grants the negotiation to
begin exactly at t + d and then the value of d is known a priori by the agents);
– given two agents matched at t, the agent that opens the negotiation at t + d is
chosen randomly with a probability .5 by the negotiation platform;
– in the presence of one buyer agent and one seller agent, agents’ equilibrium
strategies are exactly those in the classic alternating-offers protocol with dead-
lines described in Section 2.2.
In matching models, such as for instance [18], agents are split in two groups such
that all the agents in the first group propose a matching and all the agents in the
second group accept or reject the proposed matching. The inclusion of a matching
mechanism in bargaining implicitly introduces asymmetries in the negotiation: buyer
agents and sellers agents will have different available actions. In our model each
buyer will announce whether or not she wants to be matched and, in the affirmative
case, will announce to which seller she wants to be matched. Instead, each seller will
choose which buyer to match (we report details below). Our extension of the original
bargaining model develops in three points. We discuss them one by one.
(1) We introduce three actions to rule the matching between two opponents, i.e.,
matchable(s j), nonmatchable, and match(bi), and one action to allow agents
to wait for the next time point, i.e., wait. The actions matchable(s j) and
nonmatchable are available at time point t to the buyers that are not matched
and the effect of the first one is to signal that the buyer is ready at time point
t to be matched by the specific seller s j, whereas the effect of the second one
is to signal that she is not ready to be matched. In order for matchable(s j) to
be a valid action at time point t, s j must be present in the market. The action
match(bi) is available to the sellers and its effect is that s j matches the buyer bi.
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Obviously, in order for match(bi) to be a valid action for s j at t, bi must have
chosen matchable(s j) at the same time point. Once two agents are matched they
start to negotiate after d time points. The action wait is available to both buyers
and sellers, and allows them to wait for the next time point. We discuss below,
at point (3), when and how agents can employ these actions.
(2) We redefine action exit: if an agent chooses exit, then she leaves the market and
her outcome is NoAgreement. Our choice is directed at excluding agents’ non-
feasible behaviors: it can be observed that if action exit does not impose agents
to leave the market, then in the presence of a unique buyer and a unique seller
the equilibrium strategies are different from those prescribed by Rubinstein’s
equilibrium. We shall show that in Section 4.1.
(3) We modify the mechanism of the game dividing each time point in two sequen-
tial stages, denoted by 1 and 2, and inhibiting and allowing actions according to
the actual state an agent is in. More precisely, in a market an agent bi (or s j) can
be in three different states:
– (S1) bi (or s j) is non-matched,
– (S2) bi (or s j) is matched with s j (or bi) and is waiting to start negotiating, or
– (S3) bi (or s j) is negotiating with s j (or bi).
Consider state (S1). If bi is not matched, then her allowed actions are the
following. In the first stage of every time point t she can choose nonmatchable
or matchable(sk) where sk must be present in the market at t. In the second
stage of every time t point she can choose wait or exit; this second action is
allowed only if bi has chosen nonmatchable in the first stage of t: we exclude
non-reasonable situations where at the same time point a buyer announces to be
ready to be matched with a specific seller and subsequently leaves the market.
If bi is matched, no action is available. If s j is not matched, then her allowed
actions are the following. In the first stage of every time point t, no action
is allowed. In the second stage of every time point t, she can choose wait or
match(bk), where bk must not be matched, or exit. If s j is matched, no action is
available. Consider state (S2). If bi (or s j) is matched and is waiting for starting
to negotiate, no action is allowed. Consider state (S3). If bi is negotiating, then
she acts alternately and her allowed actions are exactly those in the alternating-
offers protocol discussed in the previous section, i.e., offer(x), accept, and exit.
If s j is negotiating, then she acts alternately and her allowed actions are those
in the alternating-offers protocol discussed in the previous section, i.e., offer(x),
accept, and exit, plus action match(bi) if bi has chosen matchable(s j). For the
sake of clarity, the actions available to agents are summarized in Table 1.
Agents’ utility functions are exactly those defined in the previous section. Since
every agent negotiates exclusively on one item, once a negotiation is concluded with
an acceptance, the two negotiators leave the market. When m > n (or m < n) m − n
buyer agents (or n − m seller agents) will not reach any agreement and therefore
their outcomes will be NoAgreement.
We discuss an example of possible agents’ behaviors in the above protocol.
Consider a setting with four buyers (i.e., b1, b2, b3, b4) and one seller (i.e., s) with
Tb1 = 4, Tb2 = 2, Tb3 = 4, Tb4 = 4, and Ts = 6, and Ab1 = 0, Ab2 = 0, Ab3 = 0, Ab4 =
1, and As = 0 (we do not specify the value of the other parameters, being unnecessary
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Table 1 Actions available to an agent i in function of her state
State Stage Agent Time points Available actions
bi (s j) is not 1 bi Any nonmatchable,
matched matchable(sk)
2 bi Any wait, exit if bi has
made nonmatchable
s j Any wait, match(bi) if bi has
made matchable(s j), exit
bi (s j) is 2 bi Alternately offer(x), accept, exit
negotiating s j Alternately offer(x), accept, exit,
match(bi) if bi has made
matchable(s j)
for our example). In the first stage of time point t = 0, b1, b2, and b3 can choose
matchable(s) or nonmatchable (notice that b4 has not entered the market yet).
Suppose that b1 and b2 choose matchable(s), whereas b3 chooses nonmatchable. In
the second stage of time point t = 0, s can choose wait or match(bi) where i ∈ {1, 2},
b1 and b2 can choose wait, and b3 can choose wait or exit. Suppose that s chooses
match(b1) and that b1, b2, and b3 choose wait. Now, b1 and s are matched and they
will start to negotiate at t = d. Suppose that d = 1. At t = 1 the platform randomly
selects the agent that opens the negotiation. Suppose that she is s. Furthermore, at
t = 1 b4 enters the market. In the first stage of time point t = 1, b2, b3, and b4 can
choose matchable(s) or nonmatchable. Suppose that b2 chooses nonmatchable and
that b3 and b4 choose matchable(s). In the second stage of time point t = 1, s can
choose offer(·), exit, or match(bi) where i ∈ {3, 4}, b2 can choose wait or exit, and b3
and b4 can choose wait. Suppose that s chooses match(b3), that b2 chooses exit, and
that b3 and b4 choose wait. Therefore s leaves the negotiation she is carrying out with
b1 and will start to negotiate at t = 1 + d = 2 with b3.
For the sake of clarity, we introduce the notations we use in the following
sections. We denote by (t, {bi, s j}, ι(t)) the negotiation starting at t where bi and
s j are matched and ι(t) is the agent between bi and s j that acts at t. We denote
by σ ∗bi(t, s j) the optimal strategy of bi in (t, {bi, s j}, ι(t) = bi) at t, i.e., when bi is
negotiating with s j and bi is the agent that acts at t. We denote by x∗bi(t, s j) the
optimal offer, if it exists, of bi in the negotiation with s j at t. Analogously, we define
σ ∗s j(t, bi) and x
∗
s j(t, bi). We introduce the concept of equivalent value ebi(σ, t, s j) of
an action σ performed by bi at t in (t, {bi, s j}, ι(t) = bi): we define it as the value
such that Ubi(ebi(σ, t, s j), t) = EUbi(σ, t, s j) where EUbi is the utility expected by bi
from making σ at t in (t, {bi, s j}, ι(t) = bi). We denote by e∗bi(t, s j) the equivalent
value of the optimal action of bi at t in (t, {bi, s j}, ι(t) = bi). Analogously, we
define es j(σ, t, bi) and e
∗
s j(t, bi). Finally, we denote by Tbi,s j = min{Tb1 , Ts j} and by
Abi,s j = max{Ab1 , As j}.
We present our results by degrees as follows. In Section 4 we study the settings
wherein seller agents’ outside option is inhibited. In Section 5 we study the settings
wherein there is a unique seller agent and this can exploit the outside option. The
settings where there are multiple seller agents and they can exploit the outside option
will be discussed in future works.
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4 Analysis without outside option
In this section we inhibit the seller agents’ ability to exploit the outside option. They
cannot use action match(·) when they are matched. We study initially (Section 4.1)
the base case in which there is a unique buyer agent and a unique seller agent and
subsequently (Section 4.2) the general case wherein there are multiple buyer agents
and multiple seller agents.
4.1 The base case: one buyer and one seller
The analysis of this case has two aims. The first one is to show that the agents’
equilibrium strategies in the negotiation protocol discussed in the previous section
collapse to the ones in the original protocol discussed in Section 2 and therefore our
protocol is well defined. The second one is to show that the redefinition of action
exit as we accomplished in the previous section is necessary to avoid non-reasonable
agents’ strategies.
We consider the setting in which there is a unique buyer agent b1 and a unique
seller agent s1 with RPb1 > RPs1 and Ab1,s1 + d < Tb1,s1 . These last conditions assure
that the agents expect strictly positive utility from starting a negotiation. We can state
the following lemma, whose proof is omitted, being trivial.
Lemma 4.1 Once two opponents have started to negotiate, they employ the equilib-
rium strategies prescribed in Section 2.2.
The sequences of the optimal offers x∗s1(t, b1) and x
∗
b1(t, s1) are to be computed as
prescribed in Section 2.2. They are:
– x∗b1(t, s1) =
{
RPs1 if t = Tb1,s1 − 1
(x∗s1(t + 1, b1))←s1 otherwise
,
– x∗s1(t, b1) =
{
RPb1 if t = Tb1,s1 − 1
(x∗b1(t + 1, s1))←b1 otherwise
.











x∗s1(t, b1), t + 1
)
.
Indeed, with .5 probability that b1 opens the negotiation offering x∗b1(t, s1) and with
.5 probability that s1 opens the negotiation offering x∗s1(t, b1). The utility expected by
s1 from starting a negotiation with b1 at t is defined analogously. We can now state
the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2 If b1 and s1 are both present in the market at t < T − d and they are
not matched, then they prefer to immediately match themselves rather than to do it
subsequently or not to do it at all.
Proof We study b1’s optimal actions (s1’s ones can be similarly studied). We consider
the case with d = 1; when d > 1 the proof is analogous.
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We need to prove that b1’s expected utility of starting a negotiation at t is larger

















x∗b1(t + 1, s1) −
1
2
x∗s1(t + 1, b1)
)
· (δb1)t+2.
We consider the worst case, i.e., when δs1 = 1. We show that in the worst case the
above inequality holds (and therefore always holds). When δs1 = 1 we have that




· (1 − δb1) ·
(
RPb1 − x∗s1(t + 1, b1)
)
> 0.
Since RPb1 − x∗s1(t + 1, b1) > 0 by construction and 1 − δb1 > 0 by definition, the
above inequality holds for every value of the parameters. unionsq
From Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, the following theorem trivially follows.
Theorem 4.3 In presence of one buyer and one seller, agents equilibrium strategies at




if b1 is matched strategies prescribed in Section 2.2
if b1 is non-matched
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩












if s1 is matched strategies prescribed in Section 2.2
if s1 is non-matched
⎧⎨
⎩
t < T − d
{
stage 2 match(b2)




At the equilibrium, if Ab1,s1 + d < Tb1,s1 , then at t = Ab1,s1 agent b1 will make
match(s1) and agent s1 will make match(b1). They will start to negotiate at t =
Ab1,s1 + d and they will reach an agreement at t = Ab1,s1 + d + 1.
We show now that, if action exit does not impose agents to leave the negotiation
platform, then Lemma 4.1 does not hold and therefore, in the presence of a unique
buyer and a unique seller, agents’ equilibrium strategies are different from those in
the original protocol presented in Section 2.2.
Consider the bargaining setting with one buyer agent b1 and one seller agent
s1, with d = 1, and where both agents enter the market at t = 0: agents’ optimal
offers are reported in Fig. 3. It can be observed that agents will immediately
match themselves and then they will start to negotiate at t = 1. If agents can make
exit without leaving the market, then they will make it at t = 1. Consider the
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Fig. 3 Agents’ optimal offers when RPb1 = 1, δb1 = .95, Tb1 = 5, RPs1 = 0, δs1 = .95, Ts1 = 12, and
d = 1
negotiation in which ι(1) = s1: s1 opens the negotiation. If s1 employs the strategies
prescribed in Section 2.2, i.e., offer(x∗s1(1, b1)) with x
∗
s1(1, b1)  .1, then she gains
Us1(x
∗
s1(1, b1), 0)  .1. If s makes exit and subsequently match(b1) at t = 2, then she
gains  .45. To be exact, the computation of the expected utility of making exit
at t = 1 and subsequently match(b1) at t = 2 is: with probability .5 s1 acts at t = 3
offering x∗s1(3, b1) = .05 and with probability .5 b1 acts at t = 3 offering x∗b1(1, s1) =
.95; since these agreements are reached at t = 4, their utility must be discounted by
(δs1)
2. Notice that agents prefer to offer rather than to exit at t = 3 (otherwise agents
would not reach any agreement).
4.2 The general case: multiple buyers and multiple sellers
The analysis of the setting with multiple buyers and multiple sellers is not straightfor-
ward. This is due to the intrinsic complexity of the game: it is essentially a multistage
game wherein m + n agents concurrently act and the game changes at each stage.
Nevertheless, Lemma 4.1 (i.e, once two opponents are matched, they negotiate as
prescribed in Section 2.2) and Lemma 4.2 (i.e., two opponents prefer to start to
negotiate immediately rather than to wait for some time points and subsequently
start to negotiate) reduces this problem to one of matching. We recall that in this
case a matching is an assignment of buyers to sellers such that each buyer is assigned
to at most one seller and vice versa. Among all the possible matchings, we need to
find a matching that is of equilibrium. Such a matching is a stable matching that is
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optimal for the buyer agents, see [18]. Formally, a matching is said to be stable if
there is not any bi, b j, sk, sl such that:
– bi is matched to sk,
– b j is matched to sl ,
– bi prefers sl than sk and sl prefers bi than sk.
A stable matching can be found by employing the Gale-Shapley’s stable marriage
algorithm [18]. Gale and Shapley consider the problem of matching males and
females given that each male has a preference ordering over the females and each
female has a preference ordering over the males. They provide two versions of their
algorithm. In the first one, a male proposes to the female and the resulting matching
is optimal for the male. In the second one, vice versa. In what follows we present
an algorithm based on Gale-Shapley’s algorithm to address our specific case. The
algorithm develops in three steps. For the sake of presentation, we initially consider
the case in which m = n and mini{RPbi} > max j{RPs j} and subsequently we consider
the general case. (This is because Gale-Shapley’s algorithm requires that the number
of buyers is equal to the number of sellers and that every agent prefers to be matched
rather than not to be.)
Step 1 In this step the utility expected by every agent from negotiating with every
possible opponent is computed. That is, for every buyer agent bi the expected
utility from negotiating with every possible s j must be computed, and vice







x∗b1(Abi,s j + d), Abi,s j + d + 1
)
+ if Abi,s j + d < Tbi,s j
+ 12 Ub1
(




The utility expected by s j from negotiating with bi is defined analogously.
In order to compute the agents’ expected utilities, we need to compute
the sequences of the agents’ optimal offers in all the possible negotiations.
Exactly, the number of backward induction constructions to be built are
2 · m · n and therefore the computational time required to calculate all the
optimal offer sequences is O(m · n · maxi, j{Tbi,s j}).
Step 2 On the basis of the agents’ expected utilities, agents’ preference ordering
concerning the opponents to whom they would be matched are found. More
precisely, for every buyer bi (and for every seller s j) we need to sort the
sellers (the buyers) from the one who gives bi the maximum expected utility
to the one who gives bi the minimum expected utility. An example is the
following: ⎛
⎜⎜⎝
b1 : s2  s3  s1  s5  s6  . . .
b2 : s7  s1  s3  s4  s2  . . .
. . . . . .
bm : s7  s5  s2  s1  s6  . . .
⎞
⎟⎟⎠
(this is to say that b1 prefers to match s2 than s3, prefers to match s3 than
s1, and so on). The sellers’ preference ordering can be found analogously.
The computational time required to build agents’ preference orderings is
O(m · n).
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Step 3 On the basis of the agents’ preferences we can apply Gale-Shapley’s algo-
rithm. We reciew their algorithm in our specific case.
Definition 4.4 (Gale-Shapley stable marriage algorithm) The algorithm is iterative.
Let k = 1.
1. Each buyer agent that is not matched proposes to the k-th top-ranked seller agent
in her preferences.
2. Each seller agent keeps her top-ranked proposal among the ones she has
received (including ones from previous iterative steps). Two cases are possible.
In the first case each seller agent receives only one proposal. In this case, each
buyer agent matches a seller agent and then the algorithm terminates. In the
second case some seller agents receive more than one proposal. In this case, these
agents choose the buyer agent they prefer and the algorithm goes to step 3.
3. The value of k is increased by 1 and the algorithm goes to step 1.
The Gale-Shapley’s work shows that:
– the algorithm always terminates (the proof is trivial, the number of buyers and
sellers being finite),
– a stable matching always exists,
– the produced matching is optimal for the buyer agents.
Furthermore, the stable matching that is optimal for the buyers is unique except
when agents are indifferent to two or more matching agents. For instance, when b1’s
preferences prescribe s1 ∼ s2  s3  . . .  sn. This happens when the utility expected
by b1 from matching s1 is equal to the one expected from matching s2. Generally, this
happens only for a null-measure subset of the space of the parameters and therefore
is negligible.4
To capture the cases in which m = n and mini{RPbi} < max j{RPs j}, the algorithm
must be extended. We proceed by degrees. We consider the situations where m = n.
As is underlined by Gale and Shapley, when m = n we need to introduce fictitious
agents. Suppose that m > n (the case in which m < n can be treated analogously),
m − n buyer agents cannot be matched. In order for Gale-Shapley’s algorithm to
work correctly, we need to introduce m − n fictitious seller agents such that the utility
expected by a buyer agent from negotiating with one of these agents is zero. The
preferences of the fictitious agents can be anything. If the matching produced by the
above algorithm prescribes bi to be matched with a fictitious seller agent, then (in
practice) bi will not be matched.
We consider the cases where mini{RPbi} < max j{RPs j}. In these situations agents
could prefer not to be matched rather than to be matched. For instance, when
RPb1 = .5, RPb2 = .6, RPb3 = .4 and RPs1 = .2, RPs2 = .3, RPs3 = .7, s prefers not
to be matched rather than to be matched. Similarly to what we have done previously,
these cases can be addressed by introducing fictitious agents. We need to introduce
m fictitious seller agents and n fictitious buyer agents. In this way, the overall number
4In measure theory, a null measure set is a set that is negligible for the purposes of the measure
in question [23]. As commonly done in the literature to study sets in Euclidean n-space Rn, we use
Lebesgue measure.
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of buyer agents is equal to the overall number of seller agents, i.e., m + n. As above,
the utility expected by an agent from negotiating with a fictitious agent is zero and
the preferences of the fictitious agents can be anything. Notice that in the case
maxi{RPbi} < min j{RPs j}, the matching produced by the above algorithm prescribes
that all the buyers agents will be matched to the fictitious seller agents and all the
seller agents will be matched to the fictitious buyer agents. The number of iterations
in Gale-Shapley’s algorithm in the worst case is O((m + n)2).
In summary, the problem of bargaining when the outside option is inhibited can be
reduced in polynomial time to the problem of finding a stable matching. With single-
issue negotiation the computational complexity is therefore O(m · n · maxi, j{Tbi,s j} +
(m + n)2). The presence of multiple issues exclusively affects the computation of Step
1 and therefore the computational complexity is O(l · m · n · maxi, j{Tbi,s j} + (m +
n)2).
5 Analysis with outside option and one-sided competition
In this section we consider the setting where there is a unique seller and she can
exploit the outside option. We game theoretically analyze the base case wherein
there are two buyers, b1 and b2, with RPb1 = RPb2 = RPb > RPs, Tb1 ≤ Tb2 ,
and Ab1 = −d, Ab2 = −d.5 We discuss in Appendix A the general case. At first
(Section 5.1) we provide agents’ equilibrium strategies, subsequently (Section 5.2)
we discuss equilibrium uniqueness.
5.1 Equilibrium strategies in the base case
The equilibrium strategies can be found by applying the backward induction method,
but, due to the complexity of the this setting, its application is much involved. (We
write in this section the bottom-line of the application of the backward induction
method and we report the pertinent proofs in Appendix B.) Without loss of gener-
ality we suppose that s will enter the market at t = −d. Therefore, she will choose
match(bi) with i ∈ {1, 2} at t = −d and subsequently s and the matched bi will begin
to negotiate at t = 0.6 First we find backwards the optimal strategies of the agents
from t = T, where T = min{max{Tb1 , Tb2}, Ts}, to t = 0 in all the possible subgames
that the agents can play in and subsequently we determine how bi can be optimally
matched by s at t = −d. More precisely, with b1 and b2 we must provide agents’
optimal strategies in all the following subgames: (t, b1, b1), (t, b1, s), (t, b2, b2),
and (t, b2, s) for any 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
We firstly consider the non-matched buyers’ optimal actions in the first stage
of any time point. Each buyer bi will choose matchable at t if t < min{Tbi , T} − d.
As we shall show below, because RPb1 = RPb2 each bi expects a strictly positive
utility from starting a negotiation at t < min{Tbi , T}. Instead, agent bi expects zero
utility from starting a negotiation at t ≥ Tbi or at t ≥ T. Indeed, if bi starts to
5For the sake of simplicity, we use (t, bi, ι(t)) in the place of (t, {bi, s}, ι(t)), and xbi (t), σbi (t) in the
place of x∗bi (t, s), ebi (t, s), respectively.
6By extending the analysis discussed in Section 4.1, it can be shown that the agents prefer to
immediately match their opponent rather than to wait for some time points before matching them.
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negotiate at t ≥ Tbi , then she will make exit, reaching NoAgreement and gaining
thus 0. Similarly, if bi starts to negotiate at t ≥ T, she will gain 0. As a result, bi is
indifferent between making matchable(s) and nonmatchable at t ≥ min{Tbi , T} − d.
This indifference is problematic, since it leads to the existence of multiple equilibria
with different equilibria outcomes. In this section we assume that bi will choose
nonmatchable.7 Therefore, each non-matched buyer bi will choose nonmatchable at
t if min{Tbi , T} − d ≤ t. We consider now the non-matched buyers’ actions in the
second stage of any time point. Each non-matched buyer bi will choose wait at
t < min{Tbi , T} − d and exit from t = min{Tbi , T} − d. (Notice that on the equilibrium
path a non-matched buyer bi could also choose wait at min{Tbi , T} − d ≤ t instead of
exit, but this fact does not alter the equilibrium outcome: such a buyer will never be
matched at min{Tbi , T} − d ≤ t.)
We consider now the optimal actions of the matched agents in the second stage
of each time point during the negotiation. We preliminarily introduce the principle
on which the choice rules employed by the agents at the equilibrium are based and
subsequently we discuss these choice rules in detail. As we shall show below, the
equilibrium strategies of bi can be satisfactorily defined on the basis of the sequence
x∗bi(t) similarly to the equilibrium strategies discussed in Section 2.2: if bi receives an
offer x ≤ (x∗bi(t))←bi at t, then she accepts it, otherwise she rejects it to offer x∗bi(t).
And x∗bi(t) is such that it will be accepted by s at t + 1. (Obviously, the values of
x∗bi(t) in the presence of multiple buyers will be different from those prescribed in
Section 2.2.)
On the contrary, since at some time points the optimal offer x∗s (t, bi) may be not
defined, the equilibrium strategies of s cannot be satisfactorily defined on the basis
of the sequence x∗s (t, bi). To be exact, this happens at every time point the optimal
action of s is not offer(·), but is match(·). To cope with this problem we resort to the
notion of equivalent value es(σ, t, bi) of an action σ performed by s at t in (t, bi, s):
we define it as the value such that Us(es(σ, t, bi), t) = EUs(σ, t, bi) where EUs is the
utility expected by s from making σ at t in (t, bi, s). We denote by e∗s (t, bi) the
optimal equivalent value of s at t in (t, bi, s), i.e., the equivalent value of the optimal
action.
As we shall show below, the equilibrium strategies of s can be satisfactorily defined
on the basis of x∗s (t, bi) and e∗s (t, bi): if s receives an offer x ≥ (e∗s (t, bi))←s at t, then she
accepts it, otherwise she rejects it to offer x∗s (t, bi), if x∗s (t, bi) is defined, and to choose
match(b j) with j = i, if x∗s (t, bi) is not defined. This is to say that s would accept any
offer that gives her a utility equal to or larger than the utility she expects from making
her optimal action between making an offer and matching a different opponent. The
value x∗s (t, bi) is such that it will be accepted by bi at t + 1. When σ = offer(x) and x is
an offer that will be accepted, EUs(σ, t, bi) is exactly Us(x, t) and then es(σ, t, bi) = x
independently of i and t. When σ = match(bi), the formula of EUs(σ, t, b j) with
i = j is similar to the one reported in Section 4.1. Indeed, at t + d two subgames
are possible with probability .5 each: the subgame (t + d, bi, bi) where bi acts at
t + d and the subgame (t + d, bi, s) where s act at such time point. Therefore,
EUs is obtained firstly computing the average between the utility gained by s
7We shall show in the next section that equilibrium strategies that prescribe bi to choose matchable(s)
lead to non-reasonable agents’ behaviors and we discuss how these non-reasonable equilibria can be
removed.
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from (t + d, bi, bi) and the one from (t + d, bi, s) and subsequently discounting
it for d time points with respect to δs. Precisely, s expects Us(x∗bi(t + d), t + d) from
(t + d, bi, bi)—this is because, if bi opens the negotiation, she will make an offer that
will be accepted by s—and expects Us(e∗s (t + d, bi), t + d) from (t + d, bi, s)—this is
because, if s opens the negotiation, she could make match(·) or an offer. Therefore,




bi(t + d) + 12 e∗s (t + d, bi)
)
←d[s].
We now apply the backward induction method from time point t = T back. For
the sake of presentation, we divide the backward induction construction in several
parts with respect to both time t and the buyer with whom s is currently negotiating,
and we analyze them singularly. We report such a division in Table 2. This division
has the property that agents’ optimal actions in all the time points belonging to the
same part of construction are given by the same choice rules, whereas agents’ optimal
actions in time points belonging to different parts of the construction are given by
different choice rules.
Consider the subgames (t, b2, b2) and (t, b2, s) at Tb1 − d ≤ t ≤ T − 1. At these
time points s cannot choose match(b1), since b1 will never choose matchable. There-
fore, agents’ strategies are those provided in Section 2.2. The values of x∗b2(t) and
x∗s (t, b2) can be computed as follows:⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩




x∗s (t, b2) = RPb
e∗s (t, b2) = x∗s (t, b2)
Tb1 − d ≤ t < T − 1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x∗b2(t) = (x∗s (t + 1, b2))←s
x∗s (t, b2) = (x∗b2(t + 1))←b2
e∗s (t, b2) = x∗s (t, b2)
.





Tb1 − d ≤ t < T
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≤ (x∗b2(t))←b2
otherwise offer(x∗b2(t))
T ≤ t ≤ Tb2
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≤ RPb
otherwise exit
Tb2 < t exit
,
Table 2 Intervals of time in which we divide the backward induction construction
Strategies σ ∗b1 (t), σ
∗
s (t, b1) based on x
∗
b1
(t), e∗s (t, b1)[
0, Tb1 − d
] [
Tb1 − d, min
{








T − d, Tb1 − 1
}]
Strategies σ ∗b2 (t), σ
∗
s (t, b2) based on x
∗
b2
(t), e∗s (t, b2)[
0, Tb1 − d
] [
Tb1 − d, T − 1
]
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σ ∗s (t, b2) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Tb1 − d ≤ t < T
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb2(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ (x∗s (t, b2))←s
otherwise offer(x∗s (t, b2))
T ≤ t ≤ Ts
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb2(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ RPs
otherwise exit
Ts < t exit
.
Consider the subgames (t, b1, b1) and (t, b1, s) at min{T − d, Tb1 − 1} ≤ t ≤
max{T − d, Tb1 − 1}. Two situations can be: in the first one T − d ≤ Tb1 and in
the second one Tb1 < T − d. In the first situation the optimal strategies of b1 and
s can be computed as above, since b2 will never make matchable(s) at t ≥ T − d
and then s cannot choose match(b2). In the second situation instead, the backward
induction construction is strongly different. Indeed, in (Tb1 − 1, b1, b1) s is not
obliged to accept her reservation price at t = Tb1 (as instead it happens when a





b2(t + d) + 12 x∗s (t + d, b2)
)
←d[s] and is obviously larger than RPs.
Therefore, the offer that s would accept at t = Tb1 is the offer that gives her a
utility equal to or larger than making match(b2), namely, any offer x such that
x ≥ ( 12 x∗b2(t + d) + 12 x∗s (t + d, b2))←(d+1)[s]. The availability of the outside option for
s makes the position of s at t = Tb1 stronger than her position in the situation s has
not any outside option. As such, the revenue that s expects to gain increases with
respect to the purely bilateral situation where there is no competition among buyers.
In addition, notice that for any Tb1 < t < T − d the optimal action of s in (t, b1, s)
is to choose match(b2). The values of x∗b1(t), x
∗
s (t, b1), and x
∗








x∗s (t, b1) = RPb
e∗s (t, b1) = RPb
T − d ≤ t < Tb1 − 1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x∗b1(t) = (x∗s (t + 1, b1))←s)
x∗s (t, b1) = (x∗b1(t + 1))←b1)
e∗s (t, b1) = x∗s (t, b1)
Tb1 ≤ t < T − d
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x∗b1(t) is not defined
x∗s (t, b1) is not defined




b2(t+d)+ 12 x∗s (t + d, b2)
)
←d[s]







b2(t + d + 1)
+ 12 x∗s (t + d + 1, b2)
)
←(d+1)[s]
x∗s (t, b1) = RPb
e∗s (t, b1) = RPb
.
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The optimal strategies of b1 and s can be easily defined on the basis of x∗b1(t),




min{Tb1 − 1, T − d} ≤
≤ t ≤ Tb1 − 1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept





if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≤ RPb
otherwise exit
Tb1 < t exit
,
σ ∗s (t, b1) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
min{Tb1 − 1, T − d} ≤
≤ t ≤ Tb1 − 1
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb1(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ (e∗s (t, b1))←s
otherwise offer(x∗s (t, b1))
Tb1 ≤ t < T − d
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb1(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ (e∗s (t, b1))←s
otherwise match(b2)
max{Tb1 , T − d} <
< t < Ts
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
if σb1(t − 1) = offer(x) accept
with x ≥ RPs
otherwise exit
.
Consider the subgames (t, b1, b1) and (t, b1, s) at Tb1 − d ≤ t < min{T −
d, Tb1 − 1}. In this interval of time, s can choose match(b2), since b2 chooses
matchable(s). The optimal offer of b1 at t is the lowest offer that s would accept at
t + 1, namely, (e∗(t + 1, b1))←s. The proof is trivial when s’s optimal action at t + 1
is to make an offer. Instead, when s’s optimal action at t + 1 is to make match(·),
the proof is very involved and we discuss it in Appendix B. This proof represents
the main result on bargaining with outside option, since allows one to consider a
very narrow set of possible actions in the search for the optimal agents’ strategies,
drastically reducing thus the computational complexity of finding an equilibrium.
The optimal action of s at t is the action between offer(x∗b1(t + 1))←s and match(b2)
with the greatest equivalent value, i.e., the action that maximizes the expected utility
of s. Therefore, the optimal action of s can be found at any time point through a
maximization between only these two options. Notice that in this interval of time
σ ∗b1(t) and σ
∗
s (t, b1) depend on σ
∗
b2(t + d) and σ ∗s (t + d, b2), but σ ∗b2(t) and σ ∗s (t, b2) do
not depend on σ ∗b1(t + d) and σ ∗s (t + d, b1).
The equilibrium strategies in all subgames at 0 ≤ t < Tb1 − d can be found sim-
ilarly. Here σ ∗b1(t) and σ
∗
b2(t) can be found in closed form (since the corresponding
optimal offers can be found in closed form), whereas the computation of σ ∗s (t, b1)
and σ ∗s (t, b2) requires at each time point a maximization between two possible
options: offer((x∗(t + 1))←b1) and match(b2) for the determination of σ ∗s (t, b1) and
offer((x∗(t + 1))←b2) and match(b1) for the determination of σ ∗s (t, b2). Notice that in
this interval of time σ ∗b1(t) and σ
∗
s (t, b1) depend on σ
∗
b2(t + d) and σ ∗s (t + d, b2), and
vice versa. We consider now the utility bi expects from starting a negotiation at t + d
when t < min{Tbi , T} − d. It is equal to or larger than Ubi( 12 x∗bi(t + d), d). Indeed, if
she opens the negotiation, she will offer x∗bi(t + d) and s will accept such offer. Since
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it holds RPb1 = RPb2 = RPb > RPs, all the values in the sequences x∗b1(t) and x∗b2(t)
are strictly lower than RPb, and therefore each bi expects a strictly positive utility at






x∗b1(t) = (e∗s (t+1, b1))←s













x∗s (t, b1) =
{
if e∗s (t, b1)=(x∗b1(t+1))←b1 (x∗b1(t+1))←b1
otherwise is not defined
0 ≤ t < Tb1 − d
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗b1(t) = (e∗s (t+1, b1))←s













x∗s (t, b1) =
{
if e∗s (t, b1)=(x∗b1(t+1))←b1 (x∗b1(t+1))←b1
otherwise is not defined
x∗b2(t) = (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s













x∗s (t, b2) =
{
if e∗s (t, b2)=(x∗b2(t+1))←b2 (x∗b2(t+1))←b2
otherwise is not defined
.










if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ (x∗b1(t))←b1 accept
otherwise offer(x∗b1(t))
,












if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) accept




if e∗s (t, b1) = offer(x∗s (t, b1))

























if σs(t−1) = offer(x) accept








Once we have found the equilibrium strategies from t = 0 onwards, we can easily
find the opponent to whom s can be optimally matched at t = −d. More specifically,
it is the buyer bi such that x∗bi(0) + e∗s (0, bi) is maximum. The equilibrium strategies




s (t, b1), x
∗
s (t, b2), e
∗
s (t, b1),
e∗s (t, b2). Therefore the computational complexity required to produce the above
equilibrium strategies is O(T) with single-issue negotiations and O(l · T) with l issue
negotiations.
We summarize the equilibrium strategies in Table 3. We can state now the
following theorem (it holds by construction, being the above strategies produced by
backward induction).
Theorem 5.1 The strategies provided in Table 3 constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
In Fig. 4 we report the backward induction constructions of the games (0, b1, b1),
(0, b1, s), (0, b2, b2), and (0, b2, s) with RPb1 = RPb2 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = .95, Tb1 =
9, Tb2 = 11, RPs = 0, δs = .95, Ts = 12, and d = 1. We report the agents’ optimal
offers at the time points where they are defined and the optimal equivalent values
where the optimal offers are not defined; the dashed line denotes the construction
when action match(·) is not available. For the sake of clarity, we emphasize the
Table 3 Agents’ optimal actions in the presence of two buyers with the same reservation prices and
arrival time
Situation Stage Agents Time points Optimal actions
bi (s) is not 1 bi Any matchable(s) if t < min{Tbi , T} − d,
matched nonmatchable otherwise
bi Any wait if t < min{Tbi , T} − d,
exit otherwise
2 s Any match(bi) with i =
arg max
i
{x∗bi (t + d) + e∗s (t + d, bi)}
if t < T − d, exit otherwise
bi (s) is 2 bi Alternately σ ∗bi (t) defined in Section 5.1
negotiating s Alternately σ ∗s (t, bi) defined in Section 5.1
Extending alternating-offers in markets 215

































b1 s b1 s b1 s b1 s b1 s b1 s







































s b1 s b1 s b1 s b1 s b1 s b1







































b2 s b2 s b2 s b2 s b2 s b2 s






























































Fig. 4 Backward induction constructions of the games (0, b1, s) and (0, b2, s) with RPb1 =
RPb2 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = .95, Tb1 = 9, Tb2 = 11, RPs = 0, δs = .95, Ts = 12, and d = 1
optimal equivalent values with a large circle: at such time points s chooses match(·).8
The backward induction constructions in the games (0, b1, s) and (0, b2, s) in
this setting are the same as the ones in the corresponding games in which action
match(·) is not available (the construction in (0, b2, s) is shown in Fig. 1, the
construction in (0, s, b1) is the same one as (0, b1, s), but it is translated two
time points to the left). The optimal offers in (t, b2, b2) for 8 ≤ t ≤ 11 are the
same as the corresponding game in which the action match(·) is not available. This
is because such time points are beyond Tb1 − d and then the strategies in such
subgames are not affected by the presence of b1. The optimal offers in (0, b2, b2)
are x∗b2(10) = 0, x∗s (9, b2) = .05, and x∗b2(8) = .0475, whereas the optimal offers in
(0, b2, s) are x∗s (10, b2) = 1, x∗b2(9) = .95, and x∗s (8, b2) = .9525. Consider time point
t = 9 in (9, b1, s). In the corresponding game wherein match(b2) is not available,
8Notice that the equivalents e∗s (t, bi) of choosing match(·) at t are not on the isoutility curves of
x∗bi (t + 1)s, but they are higher. Indeed, s can gain more with respect to the setting where she cannot
exploit any outside option.
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s should accept any offer equal to or larger than her reservation price, namely,
any x ≥ 0. Here, s chooses match(b2) and then she would accept any offer equal
to or larger than (e∗(9, b1))←s where e∗(9, b1) is the equivalent value of choosing
match(b2), more precisely, it is ( 12 x
∗
b2(10) + 12 x∗s (10, b2))←s = .475. The value of x∗b1(8)
is  .45. The value of x∗s (8, b1) in (8, b1, s) is RPb = 1. Consider now time point
t = 7 in (7, b2, s). In the corresponding game wherein match(b1) is not available, s
would offer  .095. Here, she chooses match(b1) whose equivalent value is  0.69.
The construction continues to time point t = 0.
Notice that the gain of s significantly increases with respect to the situation in
which there is no competition between buyers and therefore can effectively take
advantage from the competition between b1 and b2. Moreover, if any buyer except
the one with the latest deadline acts at the time point before her deadline, she cannot
impose s to accept her reservation price since s can leave the negotiation and start
a new one. Therefore, the position of the agent that act at the time point before
the deadline gets weaker and the position of the agent with the longer deadline gets
stronger with respect to the classic alternating-offers protocol.
5.2 Addressing equilibrium uniqueness
In this section, at first we show that multiple equilibria can be when agents can exploit
outside option and subsequently we show that the introduction of costs for agents
during the negotiation can lead to equilibrium uniqueness.
We show that the protocol can admit multiple equilibria. Consider, for instance,
the subgame (8, b2, s) depicted in Fig. 5 for t ≥ 8: there are two buyers b1, b2 and
the parameters are RPb1 = RPb2 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = 0.95, Tb1 = 9, Tb2 = 12, RPs = 0,
δs = .95, Ts = 12, and d = 1. Agent b1 is indifferent at t ≥ 8 between to be matched
and not to be. Indeed, if she is matched at t = 8, then, if she opens the negotiation
at t = 9, she makes exit and therefore she gains a utility of zero, if instead s opens
the negotiation at t = 9, s makes match(b2) and therefore b1 gains a utility of zero.
On the other hand, if she is not matched at t = 8, she gains a utility of zero. In
the situation wherein b1 makes matchable(s) at t = 8, s will make match(b1) at such
time point. Indeed, if s makes the offer x∗s (8, b2)  .1 as prescribed by the strategies
provided in Sections 2.2 and 5.1, then she gains Us(x∗s (8, b2), 0)  .1, whereas, if s
makes match(b1), then she expects  .44. Exactly, the computation of the expected
utility of making match(b1) at t = 8 is the following. If s acts at t = 9 (with probability
.5), she will make match(b2) and then with probability .5 s acts at t = 10 offering
x∗s (10, b2) = .05 and with probability .5 b2 acts at t = 10 offering x∗b2(10) = .95; since
these agreements are reached at t = 11, their utility must be discounted by (δs)2. If
b1 acts at t = 9 (with probability .5), she will make exit and s will make match(b2)
at t = 10; in this case with probability .5 s acts at t = 11 offering x∗s (11, b2) = 1 and
with probability .5 b2 acts at t = 11 offering x∗b2(10) = 0; since these agreements are
reached at t = 12, their utility must be discounted by (δs)3.
The above equilibrium is non-reasonable. Notice that s takes benefit from the
presence of b1 even if b1 is not in competition with b2. Indeed, b1 will never
reach any agreement with s, her deadline being expired. The presence of a buyer
should affect the equilibrium strategies only if she is “really” in competition with
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Fig. 5 Subgames (8, b2, b2) and (8, b2, s) with b1, b2 where RPb1 = RPb2 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = .95,
Tb1 = 9, Tb2 = 12, RPs = 0, δs = .95, Ts = 12, and d = 1
the others. Technically speaking, a buyer should affect the equilibrium strategies
only if she expects to gain a strictly positive utility. Furthermore, the equilibrium
non-uniqueness is a crucial problem in an electronic market, where agents can be
developed by different designers. Consider the previous example: the strategy of
b1 after her deadline is fundamental for the determination of the sequence of the
optimal offers. Since b1 has different optimal strategies after Tb1 and each of these
strategies induce different optimal strategies for b2 and s at t < Tb1 , agents could
follow different equilibria. As a result, inefficiency raises.
Now we consider the problem to remove equilibria different from those prescribed
by Theorem 5.1. In order for the protocol presented in Section 3.1 to admit a
unique equilibrium, we need that any buyer strictly prefers not to start a negotiation
rather than to start a negotiation from which she expects to reach the outcome
NoAgreement with probability equal to 1. Technically speaking, we need to remove
indifference from buyers’ actions so that buyers will always employ a unique strategy.
This condition can be easily achieved by introducing costs in negotiation: anytime
a buyer bi is matched by s, bi must pay a strictly positive fee f to the negotiation
platform on which the market is hosted. The value of f will be negligible with respect
to the utility expected by agents, otherwise agents have incentives to migrate on other
negotiation platforms. For symmetry, we require that also s pays f ; in this case we
require that she pays f only when she is not matched and makes match(·). Although
our enrichment aims at assuring the existence of a unique equilibrium outcome, it
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“naturally” makes the proposed model closer to real-world applications. Indeed, it
is reasonable that in real-world applications agents pay some fees to the negotiation
platform for the transactions they carry on.
The fee f is a little amount of money that reduces the utility of the agents involved
in the negotiation (both of the two agents that have reached an agreement and of
all the other buyers that have been matched during the negotiation). Formally, the
utility of reaching an agreement (x, t) for the agents is:
Ubi(x, t) =
{
(RPb − x) · δtbi − f · kbi if Abi ≤ t ≤ Tbi




(x − RPs) · δts − f · ks if As ≤ t ≤ Ts
−1 − f · ks otherwise , (2)
where kbi denotes the number of times that bi has been matched by s and ks is the
number of times that s has made match(·) at a time point where she was not matched;
the utility of NoAgreement for an agent i is − f · ki. Notice that if an agent i has not
been matched, i.e., ki = 0, her utility is 0.
In the general case the introduction of f > 0 alters agents’ equilibrium strategies
with respect to the ones prescribed in the previous section. However, in real-
world applications f · ks will be negligible with respect to (x∗s (t, bi) − RPs) · δts at the
equilibrium. Analogously, f · kbi will be negligible with respect to (RPbi − x∗bi(t)) · δts.
It can be shown that there exists an upper bound f¯ such that the strategies prescribed
in the previous section hold to be of equilibrium when 0 ≤ f < f¯ . The computation
of the exact upper bound f¯ is involved. However, an easily computable upper bound
(< f¯ ) for f is expressed in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2 With utility functions (1) and (2), the strategies stated in Theorem 5.1
are of equilibrium when:
0 ≤ f < 1
2
· (RPb − RPs) · (1 − δs) · (min{δb1 , δb2 , δs})T .
Proof (When f = 0, the utility functions (1) and (2) are exactly the original ones,
and therefore the result is obvious.) We initially notice that on the equilibrium path
ks = 1 (s makes only once match(·) at a time point where she is not matched), while
the values of kb1 and kb2 depend on the parameters of the game. It can be observed
that any buyer bi expects at t a utility larger than 12 Ubi((RPb)←s, t + d) from starting
a negotiation at t + d. This is because:
– with probability .5 bi opens the negotiation at t + d,
– x∗bi(t + d) ≤ (RPb)←s for any time point t + d ≤ Tbi − 1,
– x∗bi(t + d) will be accepted by s at t + d + 1.
By trivial mathematics, it can be shown that 12 · (RPb − RPs) · (1 − δs) · (min{δb1 , δb2 ,
δs})T < 12 Ubi((RPb)←s, t + d). Furthermore, it can be shown that the utility s ex-
pects to gain from starting a negotiation is strictly larger that 12 Ubi((RPb)←s, T).
Indeed, s expects at least a utility equal to 12 Us(RPb, T) and, by trivial mathematics,
it can be shown that 12 · (RPb − RPs) · (1 − δs) · (min{δb1 , δb2 , δs})T < 12 Us(RPb, T).
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Finally, the range stated in the proposition is always non-empty since for any value
of the parameters the inequality 12 · (RPb − RPs) · (1 − δs) · (min{δb1 , δb2 , δs})T > 0
holds. unionsq
Proposition 5.2 states that agents’ equilibrium strategies when f belongs to the
given range are the same ones when f = 0. This allows one no to take into account
the exact value of f in the computation the equilibrium. When f is larger than
the upper bound stated in Proposition 5.2 instead, agents’ equilibrium strategies
are generally different from those derived in the previous section. Nevertheless,
the backward induction construction in these cases is an easy extension of the one
discussed in the previous section. On the basis of Proposition 5.2 we state the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.3 The outcome induced by the strategies prescribed in Table 3 is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome of this game when f belongs to the range stated
in Proposition 5.2 but f = 0 (except for a null measure subset of the space of the
parameters).
Proof We divide the proof in two parts. In the first part we consider the situation
wherein the non-matched buyers use at the first stage of every time point the strategy
we have assigned them in the previous section, i.e., a buyer bi makes matchable(s)
if t < min{Tbi , T} − d and nonmatchable otherwise, whereas in the second part we
consider the situation where they use a different strategy.
Consider the first case. As we showed in Section 2.2, in order to analyze the
multiplicity of equilibria, we can limit our analysis to the actions that are indifferent
for the agents to their optimal actions on the equilibrium path. The actions indifferent
for the buyers are exactly the same considered in Section 2.2: to accept (x∗bi(t + 1))←bi
and to reject it to make her optimal action between offer(x∗bi(t + 1)) and exit. As we
showed in Section 2.2, no equilibrium can be if bi rejects (x∗bi(t + 1))←bi . The actions
indifferent for the seller are similar to the ones considered in Section 2.2: to accept
(e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s and to reject it to make the best among offer(x∗s (t + 1, bi)), match(·),
and exit. Similarly to what we showed in Section 2.2, it can be shown now that
no equilibrium can be if s rejects (e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s. Instead, in the situation wherein
offer(x∗s (t + 1, bi)) and match(·) are indifferent for s, two equilibrium outcomes are
possible: s can make indifferently offer(x∗s (t + 1, bi)) and match(·). However, this
happens only for a null measure subset of the space of the parameters, and therefore
it is negligible.
Consider the second case. We must focus on the situation wherein making
matchable(s) or nonmatchable is indifferent for a buyer bi before her deadline (after
her deadline the buyer strictly prefers to be not matched due to f ), but the use of
these two actions induces different agents’ strategies in the respective subgames (and
therefore they could lead to different equilibrium outcomes). In this situation, it is
possible to show that, if bi makes nonmatchable (and therefore she uses a strategy
different from the one prescribed in the previous section), no equilibrium there is.
The proof uses trivial mathematics, but it is long. We show the principle on which
the proof is based by illustrating an example. Consider the bargaining (0, b1, b1)
depicted in Fig. 4 for t ≥ 8. At t = 9 the buyer b2 is indifferent between making
matchable(s) and nonmatchable. Indeed, on the equilibrium path b1 offers x∗b1(8) at
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t = 8 and s will accept such offer and therefore b2 gains a utility of zero independently
of the action she actually makes. Be σ ∗ an equilibrium strategy profile. Assume by
contradiction that σ ∗ prescribes that b2 makes nonmatchable at t = 9. Therefore, by
backward induction, b1’s optimal offer at t = 8 is RPs. However, if b1 offers RPs at
t = 8, b2’s optimal action at t = 9 is matchable(s), since s’s optimal action at t = 9 is to
reject the offer RPs of b1 and to make match(b2). We reach thus a contradiction. As
a result, the considered σ ∗ cannot be an equilibrium strategy profile. This reasoning
can be applied iteratively from t = Tb1 back to t = 0, showing that no equilibrium
profile σ ∗ can prescribe that bi makes nonmatchable at t < min{T, Tbi} − d. unionsq
The simple modification of agents’ utility we have introduced is satisfactory since
both it assures the equilibrium to be unique and provides a model that is more
adherent to real-world applications.
6 Extending to settings with uncertainty
In presence of incomplete information, it is customary in game theory to introduce
probability distributions over the parameters that are not known by the agents. This
leads the game to be with uncertain information. Then, by Harsanyi’s transformation,
the game is cast to an imperfect information game, where players can be of different
types and uncertainty is over the opponent’s type. Classic game theory provides an
appropriate solution concept for extensive-form games with imperfect information,
i.e., the sequential equilibrium [30], but no solving technique to find it. We recall
that the backward induction method can be employed with success exclusively in the
presence of complete information [14]. From [27] there is a long standing literature in
computer science, e.g., [22, 28, 31], that studies algorithms to find Nash equilibria and
refinements, e.g., sequential equilibria [33], searching in the space of the strategies.
These algorithms have two main drawbacks that make them inapplicable in solving
bargaining situations: they work only with games with finite strategies and they
produce equilibrium strategies but not systems of beliefs.
The lack of a solving algorithm for games as bargaining has pushed researchers
to game theoretically study each possible specific setting and develop relative algo-
rithms. Nowadays, the analysis of bargaining with uncertain information is currently
more a series of examples than a coherent set of results. Well known examples of
alternating-offers settings studied in literature are: in [39] Rubinstein analyzes one-
sided uncertainty over the discount factors with only two types, in [6] Di Giunta
and Gatti analyze in pure strategies one-sided uncertainty over deadlines, in [3]
Chatterjee and Samuelson analyze uncertainty over reservation prices where the
agents can be of two possible types, and in [11] Fatima et al. consider a slight variation
of the alternating-offers protocol where there are multiple issues to negotiate and
analyze uncertainty over the weights of the issues. An interested reader can find an
exhaustive survey on bargaining with uncertain information in [4].
As a consequence, the extension of the results discussed in this paper to settings
with uncertainty is a hard task to be tackled. Anyway, the results we presented here
can significantly aid the study of those settings. Indeed, as is showed in [20], the study
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of uncertainty settings is strongly based on the complete-information solution. In
particular, in [20] the authors show that when the deadlines are uncertain the agents’
equilibrium strategies prescribe that rational agents should randomize over the offers
that are of equilibrium with complete information. The same result can be easily
extended to general settings [2]. This requires the computation of the equilibrium
offers with complete information of all the possible games for each possible agents’
type profile. This task can be accomplished with the results presented in this paper.
7 Conclusions and future works
Automated agents were suggested as a way to facilitate increasingly efficient negotia-
tions. Their automation is commonly carried out by employing game theoretical tools
and is currently a challenging issue for artificial intelligence research. In this paper we
have taken into account the best-known negotiation protocol for the most common
economic transaction, i.e., alternating-offers bargaining. A vast literature analyzes
this protocol and its refinements. In particular, several works study bargaining
settings where agents negotiate over multiple issues and/or where the value of one
or more parameters related to agents’ utility functions is uncertain. A crucial setting
that currently does not find a satisfactory analysis in the literature is the setting where
the two bargainers act in a market of bargaining agents. This setting is of paramount
importance, since the presence of multiple bargaining agents is common in real-world
electronic markets and the lack of a satisfactory model for this setting prevents an
effective employment of autonomous agents. In order to cope with this problem, we
resort to classical results from microeconomic/game theory literature. Specifically, we
model the matching problem and we introduce the outside option in the alternating-
offers protocol, i.e., the option available to an agent of leaving the negotiation she is
carrying out to start a new negotiation.
There are essentially two original contributions in this paper. First, we provided a
satisfactory bargaining protocol to capture the situation in which there are multiple
seller and buyers: agents can have different parameters, have deadlines, and the seller
agents have the option of leaving the negotiation they are carrying out to choose a
specific buyer with whom they will start a new negotiation. Second, we analyzed the
protocol, deriving equilibrium strategies. We showed that when the outside option
is inhibited, the problem can be reduced to one of matching and can be solved by
applying Gale-Shapley’s stable marriage algorithm. We derived also computational
complexity results. When there is only one seller and the outside option is not
inhibited, we showed that the protocol can admit multiple equilibria, among which
only one is reasonable. We provided an algorithm to compute this equilibrium and
showed that the introduction of fees for the players during the negotiation can lead
to remove non-reasonable equilibria.
This paper will breed a large amount of future works. At first, our interest is in
analyzing two-sided competition, where multiple buyers and multiple sellers can
be concurrently involved in bargaining. Then, our intention is to exploit results
known in literature on the presence of uncertainty in bargaining to study the effects
of uncertainty in markets of bargaining agents. A further work we are carrying
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out concerns the development of electronic platforms to support game theoretical
bargaining agents.
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Appendix
A Equilibrium strategies in the general case with one-side competition
In this section we consider the situation wherein a number n of buyers populates the
market, buyers can have different reservation prices, and they can enter the market at
different time points. We discuss these extensions by degrees in Appendices A.1, A.2,
and A.3, and we report the equilibrium strategies and the solving algorithm in
Appendix A.4.
A.1 More than two buyers
We extend the setting considered in Section 5 by introducing multiple buyers.
The presence of a number m of buyers makes the equilibrium strategies more
intricate, but the solution can be provided similarly to the case with two buyers.
The time point from which the backward induction method must be applied is
T = min{maxi∈{1,...,m}{Tbi}, Ts}. In the first step of each time point t, each non-matched
buyer bi will make matchable(s) if t < min{Tbi , T} − d and nonmatchable otherwise.
Analogously, in the second step of each time point t each non-matched buyer bi
will make wait if t < min{Tbi , T} − d and exit otherwise. We consider now agents’
strategies during the negotiation. As in the case with two buyers, the equilibrium
strategies of bi prescribe that after t = min{Tbi , T} she makes exit and from t =
min{Tbi , T} − 1 to t = 0 she makes the lowest offer that s would accept at the next
time point (otherwise she accepts an offer not worse than making her optimal
action). The equilibrium strategies of s can be produced at each time point searching
for the action, among all the available ones, that maximizes her equivalent value.
Precisely, the actions to be considered here are: to make the highest offer that
her current opponent would accept at the next time point and to match any other
possible opponent bi such that bi has made matchable(s), namely, all those bis such
that t < min{Tbi , T} − d. For the sake of presentation, we introduce the following
notation. We denote by Em(t) the set composed of the equivalent values for s of
making match(b j) at t when s is not matched and t < min{Tb j, T} − d; by em(t) the
maximum element of Em(t); and by bm(t) the buyer b j to match such that the






b j(t + d) + 12 e∗s (t + d, b j)
)
←d[s]
: ∀ j such that t < min{Tb j, T} − d
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We denote by Em(t, bi) the set defined as Em(t) but subject to j = i: Em(t, bi) is
composed of the equivalent values for s of making match(b j) at t when she is
negotiating with bi and t < min{Tb j, T} − d. In an analogous way, we define em(t, bi)
and bm(t, bi). Formally, they are:





b j(t + d) + 12 e∗s (t + d, b j)
)
←d[s]
: ∀ j such that j = i and
t < min{Tb j, T} − d
}
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In the worst case, the optimal action of s at t in (t, bi, s) can be computed through
a linear search among n non-ordered elements: n − 1 elements composing the set
Em(t, bi) and the offer (x∗bi(t + 1))←bi . Since we need to compute the optimal action
of s at t in each possible (t, bi, s) with i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the computation of the solution
would require n maximizations among n non-ordered elements at each time point
t, formally, O(n2 · T). However, such a computation can be achieved in time linear
in n. Indeed, considering em(t, bi)s for all the possible values of i, we have that at t
they can assume at most two different values. Exactly, their values can be either the
first or the second element of Em(t) once this set was ordered from the maximum
value to the minimum one. Among all the possible buyers to match, s will always
prefer to match the buyer corresponding to the maximum of Em(t), but when such
buyer is the buyer with whom she is negotiating (in this situation s will prefer to
match the buyer corresponding to the greatest equivalent value of Em(t) once the
maximum was removed). The first two greatest elements in Em(t) can be found in
time asymptotically linear in n (their computation requires two linear searches in
a non-ordered set of n elements). Once these values are found, we can compute
the optimal actions of s searching among two elements: the best buyer to match,
i.e., bm(t, bi), and greatest offer that her opponent would accept at the next time
point, i.e., (x∗bi(t + 1))←bi . Since this search must be repeated at every time point of
the negotiation, it trivially follows that the computational complexity required to
produce agents’ equilibrium strategies is O(n · T).
A.2 Different reservation prices
We extend the setting considered in the previous section by allowing buyers to have
different reservation prices. In this setting the solution presents some complications.
Trivially, in this setting we must consider only the buyers whose reservation price
is larger than the reservation price of the seller, namely, only the buyers bis such
that RPbi > RPs. Indeed, all the bis with RPbi ≤ RPs will make nonmatchable. Less
trivially, in this setting two anomalies can be:
1. the optimal action of bi at t can be to make an offer that is unacceptable for s at
t + 1 (and then the agreement will be delayed),
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2. at t a buyer bi can expect negative utility from starting a negotiation at t + d (and
then she will make nonmatchable before t = min{Tbi , T} − d).
We report an example wherein both these situations coexist. Consider a setting with
two buyers, b1 and b2, where RPb1 > RPb2 . Consider the game (t + d, b2, b2). It can
be possible that the optimal action of s at t + d + 1 is match(b1) with an equivalent
value e∗s (t + d + 1, b2) such that (e∗s (t + d + 1, b2))←s > RPb2 . Then b2 does not offer
(e∗s (t + d + 1, b2))←s at t + d (as instead prescribed by the strategies provided in
Section 5), but she makes an offer unacceptable for s. If in this situation the optimal
action of s at t + d in (t + d, b2, s) is match(b1) or to offer something unacceptable
for b2, at t b2 expects a utility equal to − f from starting to negotiate with s at t + d.
Notice that expecting a utility of zero from starting a negotiation at t + d does not
entail expecting a utility of zero from starting a negotiation at any other time point.
For instance, in the previous setting b2 could expect positive utility from starting to
negotiate at t = 0.
We find now the optimal actions of the agents when bi’s optimal offers are unac-
ceptable for s. A buyer bi makes an unacceptable offer at t when (e∗s (t + 1, bi))←bi >
RPbi , namely, when bi gains negative utility from making the lowest offer that s will
be accept. In this case, we set, for the sake of simplicity, the optimal offer of bi equal
to RPbi . Formally, we write x
∗
bi(t) = min{(e∗s (t + 1, bi))←bi , RPbi}. Notice that, when
the arrival times of the buyers are equal, s will not make an offer unacceptable for
bi. This is because s will always prefer to make match(·) rather than to make an offer
unacceptable for bi.
A buyer bi expects at t negative utility from starting a negotiation at t + d if
x∗bi(t) = RPbi (we discuss the proof in Appendix B.2). Therefore, bi makes matchable
at t < min{Tbi , T} − d if x∗bi(t + d) < RPbi and makes nonmatchable otherwise. The
equilibrium strategies can be found constraining the equivalent values that compose
the set Em(t, bi): we require that such set is composed of the equivalent values of
matching only the buyers bis such that x∗bi(t + d) < RPbi . Notice that the situation
wherein the buyers can have different reservation prices does not raise the computa-
tional complexity of finding the solution, i.e., it is O(n · T).
A.3 Different arrival times
We extend the setting considered in the previous section by allowing buyers to
enter the market at different time points. (Without loss of generality, we consider
exclusively time points ts such that t ≥ As.) Trivially, the equilibrium strategies of bi
are defined only at Abi ≤ t and the set Em(t, bi) is composed only of the equivalent






b j(t + d) + 12 e∗s (t + d, b j)
)
←d[s]
: such that j = i,
Ab j ≤ t < Tb j − d, and x∗b j(t + d) < RPb j
}
.
This is to say that s can match a buyer only if this has already entered the market.
Less trivially, in this setting two anomalies can be:
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– if s is matched with bi, it is possible that the optimal action of s is to make an
offer that is unacceptable for bi,
– if s is not matched, it is possible that her optimal action is to wait rather than to
make match(·).
We report two examples. Consider a setting with two buyers, b1 and b2, where
RPb2 > RPb1 and Ab2 > Ab1 > Tb2 > Tb1 . Consider the game (Ab2 , b1, s). It can be
possible that the optimal action of s at t = Ab2 is match(b2) with an equivalent value
e∗s (Ab2 , b1) such that (e∗s (Ab2 , b1))←2[s] > RPb1 . At t = Ab2 − 2 the optimal action of
s is to make an offer unacceptable for b1. Indeed, since t < Ab2 , s cannot match b2
and, since (e∗s (Ab2 , b1))←2[s] > RPb1 , s prefers to wait for t = Ab2 and then to make
match(b2) rather than to make any offer that b1 would accept at t = Ab2 − 1 (or to
make exit). Consider now a setting with two buyers, b1 and b2, where RPb2 > RPb1
and Ab2 > Tb2 > Ab1 > Tb1 . Consider the situation at t < Tb1 − d where s is not
matched. It can be possible that the utility s gains from waiting for Ab2 and then
making match(b2) is larger than the utility s gains from negotiating with bi. Therefore
s prefers to make wait rather than to make match(·).
We find now the optimal actions of the agents when s’s optimal offers are
unacceptable the matched buyer. s makes an unacceptable offer at t when (e∗s (t +
2, bi))←2[s] > max{RPbi , em(t, bi)}, namely, when s gains more from waiting for two
time points rather than to make an acceptable offer or make match(bm(t, bi)).
In this case, we set, for the sake of simplicity, the optimal offer of s equal
to (e∗s (t + 2, bi))←2[s]. Formally, we write e∗s (t, bi) = max{(x∗bi(t))←bi , em(t, bi), (e∗s (t +
2, bi))←2[s]} and x∗s (t, bi) = e∗s (t, bi) if e∗s (t, bi) = em(t, bi) and x∗s (t, bi) is not defined
otherwise.
In order to capture the situation where a non-matched s prefers to wait for some










∀ j such that t < Ab j
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The set Ew(t) is composed of the equivalent value for s of matching buyers that they
are not present in the market at t. The value ew(t) is the maximum element of Ew(t).
Agent s will prefer to wait rather than to match a buyer when ew(t) > em(t). Notice
that the situation wherein the buyers can enter the market at different time points
does not raise the computational complexity of finding the solution, i.e., it is O(n · T).
A.4 Equilibrium strategies and solving algorithm
We summarize in Table 4 the optimal actions of the agents in any possible situation
wherein the market can be. In what follows, we provide the formulas to compute the
sequences x∗bi(t), x
∗
s (t, bi), and e
∗
s (t, bi) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
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Table 4 Agents’ optimal actions in the general case for t ≥ As
Situation Stage Agents Time points Optimal actions
bi (s) is not 1 bi Any matchable(s) if Abi ≤ t < min{Tbi , T}
matched −d and x∗bi (t + d) < RPbi ,
nonmatchable otherwise
2 bi Any wait if t < min{Tbi , T} − d,
exit otherwise
match(bm(t)) if em(t) ≥ ew(t),
s Any else wait if t < T − d, and
exit otherwise
bi (s) is 2 bi Alternately σ ∗bi (t) defined in Appendix A.4
negotiating 2 s Alternately σ ∗s (t, bi) defined in Appendix A.4








x∗s (t, bi) = RPbi




x∗bi(t) = (x∗s (t + 1, bi))←s
x∗s (t, bi) = (x∗bi(t + 1))←bi




x∗bi(t) = min{(e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s, RPbi}
e∗s (t, bi) = max{(x∗bi(t + 1))←bi , em(t, bi), (e∗s (t + 2, bi))←2[s]}
x∗s (t, bi) =
{
if e∗s (t, bi) = em(t, bi) e∗s (t, bi)
otherwise is not defined
,
(3)








x∗s (t, bi) = RPbi




x∗bi(t) = (x∗s (t + 1, bi))←s
x∗s (t, bi) = (x∗bi(t + 1))←bi
e∗s (t, bi) = x∗s (t, bi)
0 ≤ t < T − d
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗bi(t) = min{(e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s, RPbi}
e∗s (t, bi) = max{(x∗bi(t + 1))←bi , em(t, bi), (e∗s (t + 2, bi))←2[s]}
x∗s (t, bi) =
{
if e∗s (t, bi) = em(t, bi) e∗s (t, bi)
otherwise is not defined
,
(4)
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Tbi ≤ t < T − d
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
x∗bi(t) = is not defined
x∗s (t, bi) = is not defined
e∗s (t, bi) = max{em(t, bi), ew(t)}
0 ≤ t ≤ Tbi − 1
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
x∗bi(t) = min{(e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s, RPbi}
e∗s (t, bi) = max{(x∗bi(t + 1))←bi , em(t, bi), (e∗s (t + 2, bi))←2[s]}
x∗s (t, bi) =
{
if e∗s (t, bi) = em(t, bi) e∗s (t, bi)
otherwise is not defined
.
(5)
The equilibrium strategies during the negotiations can be defined on the basis of
the above sequences as follows.





t = 0 offer(min{RPbi , x∗bi(t)})
0 < t < T
{
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ (x∗bi(t))←bi accept
otherwise offer(x∗bi(t))
T ≤ t ≤ Tbi
{
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ RPbi accept
otherwise exit
Tbi < t exit
,






















if σbi(t−1) = offer(x) accept
with x≤(e∗s (t, bi))←s




if σs(t−1) =offer(x) accept
with x≤ RPs
otherwise exit
Ts < t exit
,
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t = 0 offer(min{RPbi , x∗bi(t)})
0 < t < Tbi
{




if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ RPbi accept
otherwise exit
Tbi < t exit
,



















if σbi(t−1)=offer(x) with x≤(e∗s (t, bi))←s accept
otherwise offer(x∗s (t, bi))
Tbi ≤ t≤Ts
{
if σs(t−1)=offer(x) with x≤ RPs accept
otherwise exit
Ts < t exit
,





t = 0 offer(min{RPbi , x∗bi(t)})
0 < t < Tbi
{




if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ RPbi accept
otherwise exit
Tbi < t exit
,





if e∗s (t, bi) = em(t, bi) offer(x∗bi(t))
otherwise match(bm(t, bi))
0 < t < Tbi
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
if σbi(t − 1) = offer(x)




if e∗s (t, bi) = em(t, bi) offer(x∗bi(t))
otherwise match(bm(t, bi))
Tbi ≤ t < T − d
{
if σbi(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ (e∗s (t, bi))←s accept
otherwise match(bm(t, bi))
T − d ≤ t ≤ Ts
{
if σs(t − 1) = offer(x) with x ≤ RPs accept
otherwise exit
Ts < t exit
.
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We state the following theorem (it holds by construction, being the above strate-
gies produced by backward induction).
Theorem 5.6 The strategies provided in Table 4 constitute a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
We report in Fig. 6 the backward induction construction in the presence of B =
{b1, b2, b3} with RPb1 = RPb2 = RPb3 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = δb3 = 0.95, Tb1 = 8, Tb2 = 13,
Tb3 = 16, Ab1 = −1, Ab2 = −1, Ab3 = −1, RPs = 0, δs = 0.95, Ts = 18, As = −1, and
d = 1. We report the optimal offers of the agents where they are defined and the
optimal equivalent values where the optimal offer are not defined; we emphasize
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Fig. 6 Backward induction constructions with RPb1 = RPb2 = RPb3 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = δb3 = 0.95,
Tb1 = 8, Tb2 = 13, Tb3 = 16, Ab1 = −1, Ab2 = −1, Ab3 = −1, RPs = 0, δs = 0.95, Ts = 18, As =−1, and d = 1
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the optimal equivalent values with a large circle and we specify the buyer to match
aside the circle; the dashed line denotes the constructions when action match(·) is
not available. The three buyers are present in the market from the initial time. On
the equilibrium path s matches b1 at t = −1 and, independently of what agent opens
the negotiation at t = 0, the negotiation will close at t = 1. (Indeed, if s opens the
negotiation, she will make an offer that b1 will accept at the next time point.) It can
be observed that the price at which agents draw up their contract in (0, b1, s) raises
with respect to the situation wherein s cannot exploit outside option. And therefore
s expects to gain more.
We report in Fig. 7 the backward induction construction with the same setting
considered in Fig. 6, but in this case b2 and b3 enter the market at t = 3 and the
buyers’ reservation prices are different: RPb1 = 0.7, RPb2 = 0.9, RPb3 = 1. Several
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Fig. 7 Backward induction constructions with RPb1 = 0.7, RPb2 = 0.9, RPb3 = 1, δb1 = δb2 = δb3 =
0.95, Tb1 = 8, Tb2 = 13, Tb3 = 16, Ab1 = −1, Ab2 = 3, Ab3 = 3, RPs = 0, δs = 0.95, Ts = 18, As =−1, and d = 1
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differences between Figs. 6 and 7 can be observed. Since in the setting depicted in
Fig. 7 the buyers b2 and b3 enter the market at t = 3, the sequences of the optimal
offers and equivalent values begin at t = 4. Indeed, s can match them only at t = 3 and
then the corresponding negotiations, being d = 1, begin at t = 4. Moreover, b1 makes
an offer unacceptable for s at t = 6 in (0, b1, b1). Indeed, it can be observed in figure
that x∗b1(6) > RPb1 . Also in this case s will match b1 at t = −1 on the equilibrium path,
and the negotiation will close at t = 1.
The computation of the strategies is essentially straightforward and requires
exclusively the calculation of the sequences x∗bi s, x
∗
s (t, bi)s, e
∗
s (t, bi)s for every i. Once
these values are found, they can be used in the strategies prescribed in Table 4. We
report our solving algorithm in Algorithm 1. The computational complexity of the
proposed algorithm is O(m · T). Notice that asymptotic computational complexity
of solving the considered setting is the same one of solving the setting where s has
not any outside option. Therefore, although we have enriched the negotiation model
capturing competition among buyers, we have not raised the asymptotic computa-
tional complexity. In presence of multiple issues, the computational complexity is
O(l · m · T), where l is the number of issues to negotiate.
Algorithm 1 equilibrium_finder(RPs, δs, Ts, As, {RPbi}, {δbi}, {Tbi}, {Abi}, n, d)
1: T ← min{max{Tbi }
i∈{1,...,n}
, Ts}
2: for (t = T − 1; t ≥ As; t = t − 1) do
3: for (i = 1; i ≤ n; i = i + 1) do
4: if (RPbi > RPs ∧ t ≥ Abi ) then
5: if (T ≤ Tbi ) then
6: compute x∗bi (t), x
∗
s (t, bi), e
∗
s (t, bi) as prescribed by formulas (3)
7: end if
8: if (T − d ≤ Tbi < T) then
9: compute x∗bi (t), x
∗
s (t, bi), e
∗
s (t, bi) as prescribed by formulas (4)
10: end if
11: if (Tbi < T − d) then
12: compute x∗bi (t), x
∗
s (t, bi), e
∗
s (t, bi) as prescribed by formulas (5)
13: end if
14: else
15: x∗bi (t), x
∗
s (t, bi), e
∗




19: return [x∗bi (t), x∗s (t, bi), e∗s (t, bi), T]
B Proofs
We discuss below the proofs of the main theoretical results provided along the paper.
B.1 Buyer’s optimal action with b1, b2
This section is devoted to prove that the optimal action of bi in (t, bi, bi) at t is to
offer (e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s. We consider the situation where d = 1. It can be easily shown
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that the theoretical results we provided below hold also when d > 1. We initially state
the following lemma.
Lemma 5.7 Given a bargaining situation (t, b2, b2) with RPb1 = RPb1 = RPb and
Ab1 = Ab2 and such that on the equilibrium path:
– s’s optimal actions from t + 1 are to make two consecutive matches, i.e., σ ∗s (t +
1, b2) = match(b1) and σ ∗s (t + 2, b1) = match(b2),
– b1’s optimal action at t + 2 is to make an offer that s will accept at the next time
point,
– s’s and b2’s optimal actions at t + 3 are to make offers that their opponent will
accept,
then the optimal action of b2 at t is to offer (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s.
Proof Trivially, among all the offers that s will accept at t + 1, (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s is
the offer that maximizes the utility of b2. We must show that b2 does not prefer
to make an offer that is unacceptable for s rather than to offer (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s.
We calculate the equivalent value for b2 to make at t an offer unacceptable for
s at t + 1 and we compare it with (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s. We denote by eb2(unacc.) the
equivalent value for b2 to make at t an offer unacceptable for s at t + 1. We denote
by x the average between the offer that would make b2 at t + 3 in (t + 3, b2, b2)




s (t + 3, b2). The equivalent value eb2(unacc.) can be expressed in function of x
as follows: x = ( 12 x←b2 + 12 RPb)←2[b2]. Indeed, b2 expects a utility of zero at t + 2
with a probability of 0.5 and x at t + 3 with a probability of 0.5. We can provide an
upper bound of (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s in function of x. Precisely, it is (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s <
( 12 x←s + 12 RPb)←2[s]. Indeed, the exact value of (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s is ( 12 x←s + 12 x∗b1(t +
2))←2[s] and the value of x∗b1(t + 2) whereby (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s is maximum is RPb.
It can be easily observed that (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s < ( 12 x←s + 12 RPb)←2[s] < ( 12 x←b2 +
1
2 RPb)←2[b2] = eb2(unacc.). Therefore, b2 prefers to offer (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s rather than
to make any other action. unionsq
Now we generalize Lemma 5.7 as follows.
Lemma 5.8 Given a bargaining situation (t, b2, b2) with RPb1 = RPb1 = RPb and
Ab1 = Ab2 and such that on the equilibrium path:
– s’s optimal actions from t + 1 is to make k > 1 consecutive matches with k
even, i.e., σ ∗s (t + 1, b2) = match(b1), σ ∗s (t + 2, b1) = match(b2), σ ∗s (t + 3, b2) =
match(b1), and so on up to σ ∗s (t + k, b1) = match(b2),
– b1’s optimal action at t + 2l with l ∈ {1, . . . , k2 } is to make an offer that s will accept
at the next time point,
– b2’s optimal action at t + 2l + 1 with l ∈ {1, . . . , k2 − 1} is to make an offer that s
will accept at the next time point,
– s’s and b2’s optimal actions at t + k + 1 are to make offers that their opponent will
accept,
then the optimal action of b2 at t is to offer (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s.
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Proof sketch Similarly to analysis provided in the proof of Lemma 5.7, we can
calculate the equivalent value for b2 of making at t an offer unacceptable for s at
the next time point and we can compare it with respect to (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s. We
denote by x the average between the offer that would make b2 at t + k + 1 in (t +
k + 1, b2, b2) and the offer that would make s at t + k + 1 in (t + k + 1, b2, s): it is
x = 12 x∗b2(t + k + 1) + 12 x∗s (t + k + 1, b2). We can provide a lower bound of the equiv-
alent value eb2(unacc.) in function of x as follows: eb2(unacc.) > (RPb
∑k/2
i=1[21−2i] +∑k/2−1
i=1 [2−2i · x∗b2(t + 2i + 1)] + x←b2)←2[b2]. Similarly, we can provide an upper bound
of (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s in function of x as follows: (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s < (RPb
∑k/2
i=1[21−2i] +∑k/2−1
i=1 [2−2i · x∗b2(t + 2i + 1)] + x←s)←2[s]. It can be easily observed that (e∗s (t +
1, b2))←s < eb2(unacc.) and therefore b2 prefers to offer (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s rather than
to make any other action. unionsq
Analogously to what we made above, we can state the following lemma, whose
proof is omitted since it is similar to the proof of Lemma 5.8.
Lemma 5.9 Given a bargaining situation (t, b2, b2) with RPb1 = RPb1 = RPb and
Ab1 = Ab2 and such that on the equilibrium path:
– s’s optimal actions from t + 1 is to make k > 1 consecutive matches with k odd, i.e.,
σ ∗s (t + 1, b2) = match(b1), σ ∗s (t + 2, b1) = match(b2), σ ∗s (t + 3, b2) = match(b1),
and so on up to σ ∗s (t + k, b2) = match(b1),
– b1’s optimal action at t + 2l + 1 with l ∈ {1, . . . , k−12 } is to make an offer that s will
accept at the next time point,
– b2’s optimal action at t + 2l with l ∈ {1, . . . , k−12 − 1} is to make an offer that s will
accept at the next time point,
– s’s and b1’s optimal actions at t + k + 1 are to make offers that their opponent will
accept,
then the optimal action of b2 at t is to offer (e∗s (t + 1, b2))←s.
On the basis of Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5.3 When the information is complete, the optimal action of bi at t is to
offer (e∗s (t + 1, bi))←s.
Proof In the following situations the proof is trivial:
1. when the optimal action of s at t + 1 is to make an offer, i.e., when e∗s (t + 1, bi) =
(x∗bi(t + 2))←bi ,
2. when the optimal action of s at t + 1 is to make match(bi) and the equilibrium
strategies in the subgames starting at t + 2 where s negotiates with bi prescribe
that s and bi reach an agreement at t + 3.
Easily, in the first situation the analysis is exactly as in absence of buyers’ competition
and in the second situation bi expects a utility of zero from offering an offer
unacceptable for s. The proof in the general situation can be produced by iteratively
applying backward Lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 from t = Tb1 − 1. unionsq
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B.2 Conditions such that a buyer expects negative utility from starting a negotiation
We initially state the following lemma, whose proof is similar to the proof of
Lemma B4 and then omitted.
Lemma 5.10 A buyer bi expects negative utility from starting a negotiation at t when
x∗bi(t) = RPbi and e∗s (t, bi) > RPbi .
We can relax the condition expressed in Lemma 5.10 on the basis of the following
lemma.
Lemma 5.11 At any time point t, if x∗bi(t) = RPbi , then e∗s (t, bi) > RPbi .
Proof We consider the special case where there are two buyers, b1 and b2, with Tb1 <
Tb2 . In what follows we prove the lemma in this special case. The proof in the general
case can be provided by iterating the special case.
If x∗bi(t) = RPb1 , then the optimal action of s at t + 1 in (t + 1, b1, s) is match(b2).
Therefore, the value of (e∗s (t + 1, b1))←s is:
(e∗s (t + 1, b1))←s =
(1
2
x∗b2(t + d + 1) +
1
2




and, since x∗b1(t) = min{RPb1 , (e∗s (t + 1, b1))←s}, we have (e∗s (t + 1, b1))←s ≥ x∗b1(t).
Since by definition e∗s (t, b1) ≥ em(t, b1), in order to prove that if x∗b1(t) ≥ RPb1 then
e∗s (t, b1) > RPb1 , we can prove that if (e∗s (t + 1, b1))←s ≥ RPb1 then em(t, b1) > RPb1 .




x∗b2(t + d) +
1
2




where x∗b2(t + d) = (e∗s (t + d + 1, b2))←s and e∗s (t + d, b2) ≥ (x∗b2(t + d + 1))←b2 . By
expressing the value of em(t, b1) − (e∗s (t + 1, b1))←s we obtain:
em(t, b1)−(e∗s (t+1, b1))←s ≥ (x∗b2(t+d+1))←b2 −x∗b2(t+d+1)δs+3RPs(1−δs) > 0.
Hence, we obtain the thesis. unionsq
Finally, we combine Lemmas 5.10 and 5.11 as follows.
Proposition 5.4 A buyer bi expects negative utility from starting a negotiation at t when
x∗bi(t) = RPbi .
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